What can be cooked from squid: quick and tasty
"You can beg for everything! Money, fame, power, but not the Motherland ... Especially such as my Russia"
First circle. Defense of Belarus, 1941
I imagined a war. But I didn’t imagine a war.- x / f "Brest Fortress"
If you watch TV, you're used to the good guys beating the bad guys. And so it is always, except for the nine o'clock news. - Yu. Latynina
Among the disasters of 41-42, the battle in Belarus is somewhat worth it. It was not the largest cauldron, but it was the first experience of such a disaster. As is often the case, a contemporary's nightmare turns out to be interesting for a historian. In Belarus, the path of the Cross of the Patriotic War began, and all the features of the 41 campaign were reflected in this battle. Anyone who takes up the study of Belarusian defense will inevitably be gnawed at the question: "Why ?!" To answer this question, you will have to seriously go beyond the description of the battle itself. Here, excuse me, I have to be more serious and dry than usual, the topic does not dispose to giggles, but it is conducive to discussion.
War is a way of deception. Pre-war situation.
When talking about the battle in Belarus, you will inevitably mention the pre-war situation. The fundamental decision to start the war was made immediately after the surrender of France in the summer of 1940. It should be noted that Hitler was rather curly thinking: "We will not attack England, but we will break those illusions that give England the will to resist. Then we can hope for a change in her position. The war itself is won. France fell away from the" British lion " . Italy shackles British troops. Submarine and air war can decide the outcome of the war, but it will last a year or two. England's hope is Russia and America. If hopes for Russia are dashed, America will also fall away from England, since the defeat of Russia will have an incredible strengthening Japan in East Asia. "(in Halder's entry)
It was this line of thought that largely determined the misunderstandings of Stalin and the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It was assumed that Hitler was a politician, and before the aggression he would begin to make some, even idiotic, demands. But the idea that the USSR will be attacked with the aim of bringing England out of the war, and even influencing America by strengthening Japan in this way ... we agree that such an idea is not trivial. The topic of the shrewd scouts who stole German plans before they lay down on the table to the performers, almost from the Fuhrer's desk, is already common place... However, if we pay attention to what exactly the intelligence was reporting, the reputation of the GRU as an organization-Baghdad thief will somewhat tarnish. The GRU despatches suffered the fate of Vanga's predictions: everyone remembers the predictions that came true, but few remember them all. In particular, on December 29, 1940, a report was sent to Moscow with the following content: “Hitler gave an order to prepare for war with the USSR. War will be declared in March 1941 " In March, the intelligence department reported: "The beginning of the offensive on the USSR is approximately May 20" But later a forecast is made: "Based on all the above statements and possible options actions in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the start of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable peace for Germany. " On May 31, GRU director Golikov reported the following alignment of forces of the Third Reich: "against England (on all fronts) 122-126 divisions, against the USSR - 120-122 divisions, reserves - 44-48 divisions". This arrangement was interpreted as preparation for containing the Red Army in the event of its intervention in the expected "Sea Lion", an operation against England. Those who watched the "Brest Fortress" probably remember how Kizhevatov is tormented by doubts. New information is constantly emerging: the war will begin tomorrow, in May, in August, it will not start at all ... The border guard in the film was tormented by the same questions that in real life did not allow politicians and the military in Moscow and Minsk to sleep. It should be noted that this "white noise" was not the result of the curvature and stupidity of the scouts. The Germans were quite consciously playing the game in this direction. The German Foreign Ministry either sang songs about peace, or was silent at all. The mobilization had already been carried out, and it was quite reasonably explained by the ongoing war with Britain. On the other side. The Germans were deploying for a long time (already from January 41st) and in several waves. Mobile connections, which undoubtedly indicated an impending strike, arrived last and were detected with a delay.
The last doubts were resolved in mid-June. The famous TASS report is published on the 14th. The general meaning: we are fighting for peace, rumors of tensions with Germany are groundless. The deathly silence of the German diplomats determined further steps. On June 15, a cover plan is put into effect: troops begin to move into designated areas. Too late!
Here I am forced to make an extensive digression. A country and a peacetime army must perform two basic steps in order to operate at full strength. First, there must be mobilization, i.e. conscription into the ranks of civilians. According to the mobilization plan, the Red Army before the war was supposed to disperse up to 8 million people. National specificity was dictated by the general poverty of the country: in addition to people, transport was also subject to mobilization from the national economy. It is obvious that, for example, a mechanized corps without cars and tractors is incapacitated: there is nothing to carry artillery, carry shells, carry infantry, etc. etc. The Soviet mechanized corps were already incorrectly balanced, in reality they needed much more auxiliary equipment. But the late mobilization made the situation simply catastrophic.
For example. From the report of the commander of the 33rd tank division: June 18, 1941 Top secret To the head of the organizational mobility department of the headquarters of the Western Military District about ammunition - approx.P.Ch.)
I translate: in combat conditions, a tank division will leave exactly the distance that one refueling will be enough for (if it is already in the tanks, which is also not a fact, by the way). Next will go 7% of equipment for which there are tankers, and the rest of the BT and T-26 will become very large iron paperweights. The most annoying thing is that gasoline as such may well be in nature. Only it is located in Sokolka (a town near Bialystok, location 33 TD), and it will be necessary to fight somewhere near Druskenikaya, 50 km to the north, or even break out of the boiler to the east (and to Minsk about 200 km, between other). Having 7% of the required filling, the division will quickly lose its combat effectiveness, which actually happened. There were most likely some petrol stations. Only they still had to be obtained from the national economy. We simply did not have time to do that.
The second thing that the army must do when the signal to start a war is to go through the deployment. That is, in Russian speaking, to reach the designated positions. With deployment, the situation was no better. The Red Army was torn apart into three unconnected echelons. Actually, at the border there was a miserable amount, completely insufficient to repel the offensive. For clarity - if you please, a map of the disposition of troops on June 21.
What do we see here? We see the German troops compactly located near the border, and the Red Army spread out into the depths. With a general superiority in forces among the Germans and a qualitative superiority, such an arrangement made the defeat of Pavlov's troops inevitable. At the same time, the mobile formations of the front are quite logically assembled in the center of the ledge between Grodno and Surazh, from where it is possible to deliver counterattacks in any direction, but this in no way compensates for the lack of infantry. For example, in the 3rd Army, only one rifle corps can start a battle on June 22, the other is still traveling between Molodechno and Lida. In general, the concept of delayed mobilization and deployment as the main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army is quite common today. At the modern level, this topic was revived by A. Isaev, but A. Vasilevsky raised it. (literally: “It would not be wrong to say that if to the enormous efforts of the party and the people aimed at the all-round strengthening of the country's military potential, we added the timely mobilization and deployment of the Armed Forces, transferring them completely to a combat position in the border districts, military operations would unfold would be in many ways different ") When they recall the theory of Viktor Suvorov about the inconceivable concentration of the Red Army on the border, I would like to ask you to point your finger at this mega-concentration. In reality, if the Red Army were getting ready for a terrible liberation campaign against Europe, it would have dismissed it in the summer of 1941, even with all the above shortcomings. Knee-deep in her own blood, putting three or four for one, retreating, probably to the Dnieper-Dvina, but she would have waved it off. The trouble is that for every Soviet rifle division there were two to five German divisions. Under these conditions, the mechanized corps could only prop up the infantry front that was crumbling before our eyes and try to push back the disaster. In Ukraine, there were more mechanized corps, fewer “panzers”, so the collapse of the Southwestern Front began only in August. The western district had to pass via dolorosa in June.
Popular culture has shaped the image of the Russian armed forces as a very numerous monster, which always has a numerical advantage over its opponents. This applied to the tsarist army, which in the west was called a "steam roller" (see, for example, Tuckman or Liddell Hart), and this attitude was transmitted to the Red Army. Meanwhile, if we nevertheless take an interest in the numerical strength of the Western District and the Center group, we will only have to grab hold of our heads. GA "Center" numbered about one million two hundred thousand people. If to concretize the armies, then this is, as someone put it at the VIF, a bunch of elephants: 3rd Panzer Group - 130,657 people; 9th Army - 382,273 people; 4th Army - 490,989 people; 2nd tank group - 181,752 people. Plus part of the direct subordination of the army group. The western front (all) did not reach 630 thousand. Here lies one of the answers to the question, where did the tanks of the Soviet mechanized corps go? They were mostly eaten not by the tanks of Goth and Guderian, but by the infantry, artillery and sappers of Kluge and Strauss. However, there were seams with the tanks in the ZAPOVO. Four mechanized corps had a total of 2,141 of these useful vehicles. In the tank groups of Hoth and Guderian, there were 3313 of them (with self-propelled guns). For both sides, combat vehicles are taken into account. The situation was even worse with transport. I do not have data specifically on the ZAPOVO and GA "Center", but it is known that as of June 22, the Red Army as a whole had about 270 thousand cars and tractors, the Germans had 600 thousand of the said equipment. It is simply pointless to qualitatively compare the "lorry" and agricultural tractors with the three-thin "Opel-Blitz" and special tractors. An army with a certain technical advantage came to the USSR.
What the Wehrmacht had and the Red Army did not have in the summer of 1941 was the experience of large maneuvering operations. About a quarter of Soviet officers (according to Krivosheev), and an even smaller share of privates, had at least some kind of combat experience, including the dubious Anschluss value of western Belarus and Ukraine. In the Wehrmacht, the fired upon fighters were several million people, the bulk of the army. When talking about combat experience, you should keep in mind not only simple numbers. Before the USSR, the Germans conducted three strategic maneuvering operations, and in one case (France) against an enemy with large mobile units of their own and trying to actively manipulate them. The Russians had, at best, Khalkhin-Gol, a battle of a tactical scale, with tens of thousands of participants on each side (but, by the way, it was at the end of Khalkhin-Gol that they paid attention to Zhukov and the best commander of 41, M. Potapov). Finland gave an experience that could not be applied anywhere except Finland itself, due to a very specific theater of hostilities. That is, the Germans had where to get a more qualified command and more combat-ready privates and junior officers.
In general terms, "Barbarossa" Army Group "Center" was assigned to the solution of the most ambitious tasks. Accordingly, she herself was the most powerful in the Wehrmacht. The highlight of the "Center" was the presence of two tank groups at once (the other GA received one each) and field armies-elephants. The Wehrmacht was at its peak. Therefore, both infantry and mobile divisions were very well equipped, they all consisted of 15-17 thousand people with a full fleet of equipment. The good equipment allowed for a certain luxury. For example, infantry divisions had motorized vanguards based on reconnaissance battles with armored cars and artillery. In terms of qualifications, the Germans also had no equal. You can make a categorical statement. In the 1930s, the Germans revolutionized military affairs. Any conversation about the successes of the Wehrmacht in 39-42. loses its meaning without understanding this fact. Both the Western armies and the Red Army spent most of the war in the role of catch-up. The level of combat effectiveness equaled on the eastern front only in the summer of 1944, on the western it, it seems, did not have time to equalize at all, the war ended earlier. I would like to note that both our and Western analysts (who wish to address Trevor Dupuis's work Numbers, Predictions and War, with an analysis of Normandy) recognized the best efficiency of the Wehrmacht in comparison with all the armies of the anti-Hitler coalition. The notorious "blitzkrieg" was indeed a very effective set of techniques. Superimposed on the country's high average education and strong military tradition, it had a stunning effect.
In conclusion, I must say about the "residual popularity" of the theory of Viktor Suvorov. It must be admitted that his hypothesis, not devoid of grace, flourished on the basis of general lack of information about the pre-war plans of the Red Army and the general closed nature of the archives. At the current level of knowledge, this theory, of course, no longer looks good. The plan is fully posted here: www.rkka.ru/docs/plans/zapovo.htm, but I will quote selected fragments.
"The general tasks of the district troops in the defense of the state border: a) stubborn defense of field fortifications along the state border and fortified areas: to prevent the invasion of both ground and air enemies into the territory of the district; to firmly cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the search for the district; (...) defense troops put a stubborn defense of fortified areas and field fortifications created along the state border, using all forces and capabilities, starting from peacetime, for their further development. Defense is based on active actions with development in depth. Any enemy attempts to break through the defense are immediately eliminated by counterattacks military and army reserves; "
What does all this mean. Let's look at the map again. If we proceed from the theory of a powerful liberation campaign against Warsaw and other Konigsberg land, then it is obvious that the mechanized corps, the main instrument of a deep operation, should be located somewhere on the edge of the Bialystok salient. In reality, we observe them strictly in the "donut hole", in the area of Bialystok itself. This is meaningless from the point of view of offensive doctrine, but just right for counterattacks: from Bialystok, you can try to fend off the threat on any part of the ledge. Considering that the service life of our mechanized corps is limited, this decision is simply nowhere more reasonable.
To summarize. In 1941, the best army in the world invaded the USSR. The Red Army itself was obviously weaker both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the situation was aggravated by the successful diplomatic preparation of the enemy.
Battlefield
In the described era, Belarus bent like a donut to the west. This bend formed a ledge with a center (both geographic and administrative) in Bialystok. Accordingly, from the German side, the bends of the border frame this "balcony" from the northwest and southwest. At the northern end of the bend there is a rather large city of Grodno. On the southern edge, on the very border - Brest. In the middle of the base of the ledge is Volkovysk, a junction of roads, to which a lot was tied in the coming battle, further to the east - Novogrudok, and even further - the capital of Belarus, Minsk. All this is a seriously swampy area, and in the south the swamps become so impassable that they completely cut off Belarus from Ukraine. The road network is weak, in fact, intercepting literally a couple of highways can be disastrous for the defender.
On the evening of June 21, a fairly well-known event took place in memoirs. The German soldier Alfred Liskov swam across the Bug and surrendered to the border guards, who did not harbor any violent enthusiasm for the march to the east. Liskov provided information of extreme importance. The attack on the USSR will take place on the morning of June 22. Nevertheless, Stalin still retained the desire to gain at least a few more days for a delayed deployment. Therefore, Directive No. 1 has been carefully worded.
a) during the night on 22.6.41, secretly occupy firing points of fortified areas on the state border; b) before dawn on 22.6.41, to disperse all aviation, including military, to field airfields, carefully camouflage it; c) bring all units on alert. Keep the troops dispersed and disguised; d) bring the air defense to combat readiness without an additional increase in the assigned personnel. Prepare all activities to darken cities and objects; e) do not carry out any other events without a special order.
That is, the command "Into the gun" was given, but so far it was ordered not to take active actions.
Black day. Brest sector, southern claw
In Belarus, even this cautious order was late. On the night of June 22, communication between the headquarters of the 4th Army and the district suddenly ceased. The timeliness of the wire breakage suggests that the author of this event was the Wehrmacht special forces, the Brandenburg regiment. Be that as it may, "Directive No. 1" the 4th Army received already under fire. The most nasty consequence of this cliff was that parts of two divisions, the 6th and 42nd, were isolated in the Brest fortress. A few days before that, most of them had been withdrawn from the fortress, but the divisions were cut apart, inside there were medical, supply, artillery, engineering, etc. subdivisions. They are auxiliary, but without them the division becomes limitedly combat-ready. That is, these units could no longer be used as a defense module for the 4th Army. In the fortress, the 45th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht encountered unexpectedly desperate and organized resistance, but the epic of the assault is a separate large topic, and there is no way to dwell on it in detail here. Nothing good happened around the fortress and in it itself. The Germans conducted an active and successful shelling, under the cover of which the infantry and tanks crossed the Bug. These were units of 2 Panzer Group Guderian and 4 of the Strauss field army, the southern wedge of the outlined "cannes", covering the Bialystok salient. What seriously surprised the Germans was that the resistance was initially very weak. Moreover, for the first few hours, almost only border guards were their opponents. Only German artillery was heard. The Wehrmacht commanders even had the feeling that they were being lured into a trap. But this was not a lure. This was a preemptive deployment. The combat log of the 3rd Panzer Division sums up: "The impression of the enemy is zero." Nevertheless, on the first day, Guderian's group stalled, overcoming the swampy Bug. The best of all was the units that had tanks equipped for underwater passage. Walter Nering, the future hero of the Vistula-Oder, remarked that it was "a magnificent performance, but rather meaningless." Further, Nering notes the courage of the border guards and adds that apart from them, almost no one has yet been met by his part. Since Guderian's infantry crossed faster than tanks, the Russians misinterpreted what was happening at first. The elephant of the 2nd Panzer Group was simply not noticed. The reconnaissance of the Western Front for the first day lists infantry with one or two tank divisions in the Brest direction. This was a terrible mistake. The situation, however, looked bad even if you didn't know about tanks. Two rifle divisions lost their combat effectiveness, and the rest of the units were gradually drawn into battles with a superior enemy. Pavlov, to whom the Grodno direction seemed more dangerous, turned to the south one rifle and one weak mechanized corps arriving from the reserve - the 17th.
Adversary on the march. In deep breaks, I had to carry barrels of gasoline with me. In the frame, judging by the emblem, a tank of the 7th division.
Black day. Grodno sector, northern claw.
There is such a mess near Grodno now! - Simonov, "The Living and the Dead"
3 Panzer Group and 9 Army in the north acted faster and more successfully. On the first day, the 9th field infantry attacked the Grodno fortified area. If the defense of the Brest Fortress is known to every schoolchild, then few people are aware of a similar drama that the soldiers of the Grodno UR experienced. Colonel Ivanov's two machine-gun battalions, which made up the garrison of the fortified area, received the order to take positions in time, and at two in the morning they were already waiting for the foe, although hardly impatiently. Unfortunately, in modern warfare, concrete bunkers could not mow down crowds of attackers as vigorously as in the First World War. Nevertheless, separate fortifications (in particular, bunker No. 59 of the junior lieutenant Goose) were kept under air raids and shelling until 28 June. That is, the organized resistance lasted no less than in Brest. But the defenders of Grodno, unfortunately, did not find their own Smirnov and Aliyev, who would tell a detailed history of their "Thermopil".
However, the courage of the defenders of the fortified area could not stop the avalanche. General Strauss's infantry broke off the weak northern flank of Kuznetsov's 3rd Army. With a defense density of 40 km per division, there was no need to talk about effective defense. For comparison, the front 40 km later was occupied by the 62nd Army of a dozen divisions in Stalingrad, and there everyone knows how hard the battle was. But unlike the southern flank, in the north Pavlov prepared for the enemy a whole series of counterattacks.
The first swallow was the 11th mechanized corps Mostovenko. On the campaign he managed to take only half of his forces (see above the pre-war report of the commander of the 33rd Panzer Division. This is just part of Mostovenko's corps), and due to the lack of communication with the front command, he rushed to the border himself, carrying out a cover plan. This was, apparently, the first of the many counterattacks of the Patriotic War.
These counterattacks are often ostracized by historians as ill-prepared, but it must be admitted that they were a better solution than waiting for 100% readiness. An analogy with France in 1940 suggests itself. The descendants of Napoleon in a similar situation stupid, slowed down and eventually acquired a quick cauldron and defeat. The beating Soviet "frog in sour cream" already influenced the operational situation, sometimes achieving even serious successes. Not this time. Mostovenko's counterattack got bogged down in the mass of the German infantry. Due to the imperfect staff structure of mechanized corps, and its even greater imperfection in reality, the tanks operated without the support of infantry and artillery, and quickly burned out in battles. During the day, the Mostovenko group lost 180 tanks, but did not achieve success. Grodno was captured.
The breakthrough at Grodno was not the worst. The main trouble broke out even further north, in the strip of the Baltic front. Herman "Papa" Hoth planned to cover the Western Front, advancing through the Baltic strip. And he succeeded in that. Directly in its own zone, his 3rd tank group met literally several Russian battalions. The command of the Baltic Front at that time was completely absorbed in the struggle against its main enemy - GA "Sever", and there was simply no strength or time left to plug the breakthrough to Alytus and further to Vilnius. Panzer Group 3 glided into the void.
So. What happened on June 22. The Germans created three major breakthroughs. In the north, through an almost undefended strip in the Baltics, Goth advances, to the east, slightly deviating to the north. To the south, near Grodno, the infantry of the 9th Army is advancing, to the southeast, towards Slonim. That is, to the rear of the Western Front. In the south, flowing around Brest, strictly northeast to Minsk through Baranovichi is Guderian and his 2nd tank group. What is important, Pavlov does not yet see this threat, thinking that there is one infantry around Brest. The 4th field army plays the role of the "weak center" of this structure and attacks the Soviet troops in the Bialystok salient head-on.
The first prisoners. Note the abundance of civilians. The Nazis often, just in case, shoved into the prisoner camps in general everyone who did not like something.
In the sky
The fight for air supremacy was lost quickly and hard by the KA Air Force. By and large, we had nothing to catch there. The Germans had the best materiel, the best organization, the best pilot training, the best everything. Nevertheless, it is incorrect to say that the Red Army aviation fell under a surprise attack on airfields. The stories of pilots who stand on the edge of the takeoff in underpants and watch dejectedly as their planes burn on the ground are simply not true. The Germans were usually met by the squadron on duty, and often they fought quite effectively. The point is different. The technical backwardness of the USSR led to the poorer equipment of airfields, their smaller number and more sluggish work of repair services. On the other hand, Soviet aviation was less well organized: the air units were subordinate to the ground army commanders, the front air force commander could not mass them in the desired sector. As a result, the Germans sequentially attacked the airfields of different units and smashed them one by one. This led to the mass death of aircraft and pilots. Sometimes enemy ground units even reached the airfields. On the evening of June 22, the commander-in-chief of the Air Force of the front, General Kopets, personally flew around part of his airfields. Seeing with his own eyes the scale of the disaster, the general shot himself. This was probably a better outcome than the fate of the front ground command.
Repair of battered I-15bis. Both the obsolete materiel and the poor technical equipment of the repair services were a serious problem for the Soviet Air Force.
Boldin's counterstrike
On the evening of June 22, Pavlov had to make a decision. Three breakthroughs required a reaction. The Goth in the north was dangerous, but he was operating in the zone of the neighboring front, and it was just a long way for the reserves to travel to this wound. Only infantry was deployed near Brest, with a slight reinforcement by tanks. There was a breakthrough at Grodno. It seemed the most dangerous, especially since the reconnaissance spotted large tank units there (you won’t ask how they saw them, apparently they were mistaken for infantry support self-propelled guns). From there the Germans taxied to the Volkovysk area, that is, to the rear of the 3rd Army, which was being pushed back to the south, and the 10th Army, which was held in the center. In general, it was decided to launch a new counterstrike on the tentacle stretching through Grodno. Pavlov's trump card has not yet been laid out on the table: the 6th mechanized corps of Mikhail Khatskilevich. To this corps, Pavlov added what was left of the troops of the unsuccessful Mostovenko, and the 6th Cavalry Corps. All these forces were united in the "Boldin group". Boldin is the castle of the front, who arrived to command his impromptu army from the band of the 10th Army.
On June 23, assigned troops began to gather in the area south of Grodno. The march of the 6th MK was heavy, accompanied by constant air strikes. Mostovenko's corps languished under the blows of the enemy, and was not in a brilliant condition. The counterattack of Boldin's group began with oncoming battles against Strauss's army, so not all assigned forces participated in the attack itself. The need to pull out units to support the infantry led to the fact that the actual counterstrike turned out to be rather weak. Nevertheless, Boldin's blow turned out to be salutary for thousands of people, which neither Boldin himself nor the Germans could have known yet.
The tanks of the mechanized corps were not knocked out by "panzers". They were driven out by artillery and infantry. In particular, this battery. On the left, in the background, two glowing silhouettes are visible.
Hello, we are your executioners
4th Army Korobkov (southern flank of the front) rolled back to the northeast. For the time being, the Russians still believed that only infantry, reinforced by one armored division, was advancing on the Fourth. But on the morning of the 24th, the Germans suddenly capture Slonim! Let me remind you that the 9th Army is coming from the northwest from Grodno, and it has already crossed the Neman. That is, for the two Soviet armies there is only a narrow neck for supply or at least flight. Guderian, however, got carried away. The reserve rifle corps, directed by Pavlov to the south, had some forces to create difficulties for the adversary. The advance units of the 2nd tgr were isolated in Slonim, as the road was intercepted. Guderian in "Memories of a Soldier" cheerfully describes this episode in the style of "and then I drove past the Russians like a train, past a beggar." But the supply columns of the two tank divisions, which were burned on the road, were not so fun and fun.
I must say, the battle of Slonim resembles some bordello on both sides. The Germans do not know where their two tank divisions are and what is happening to them, but Korobkov, the commander of the 4th Army, also does not understand a damn thing, in addition, some of the bypassed Russian formations are breaking to the east along the German rear, field commanders both sides operate for several hours to the best of their own understanding.
In these collisions, an event of tremendous importance occurs. On the road, a group of the 155th Rifle Division stumbles upon a small German motorized detachment, apparently the headquarters. The Germans were partly killed, partly pushed off the highway, and a headquarters map was found on the corpse of an officer. The map was forwarded to Pavlov. It was a blow to the crown of the head with an ax. On the Brest-Slonim direction, Pavlov saw three PzK badges. Tank corps. 24, 46, 47. Hello, we are after you. Air reconnaissance supplemented - German armored columns were seen in Slutsk, and even not far from Minsk! The terrible danger caused an unequivocal reaction. Pavlov sends the following directive to the commanders of the 10th and 3rd armies:
“Today, on the night of June 25-26, 1941, no later than 21 o'clock, start a withdrawal, prepare units. Tanks are in the vanguard, cavalry and strong anti-tank defenses are in the rear. 6th Mechanized Corps first leap - Slonim area. "
It must be said that the commander-10 Golubev gave the order for a general withdrawal of his troops even before receiving the order from Pavlov. Apparently, this is due to the fact that not even motorcycle, but ordinary infantry were already taxiing to its rear. Kuznetsov, commander-3, began organizing the retreat immediately after receiving the order. The cauldron could have closed itself earlier, but this was prevented by Boldin's group with their counterstrike, not very successful, but slowing down the enemy's advance. Since Pavlov's headquarters no longer had contact with the troops, the organization of the breakthrough fell on the shoulders of the army commanders.
Breakthrough
The loss of Slonim meant the interception of the last major highway in the rear of the two armies. The Russians still had country roads. But in order to break through to the east, it was necessary to cross several rivers, including the Shchara and Zelvyanka. These are shallow and not wide, calm flat rivers, but their banks are fiery, the floodplain is wide and muddy. And bridges are not a fact that they could withstand the weight of tanks and artillery. But it was necessary to try. Thanks to Boldin's blows, the Germans were not immediately able to proceed to pursuit. Kuznetsov's army managed to break away by several tens of kilometers. On June 27, the army could retreat calmly. But the threat appeared from where it was difficult to expect it. As already mentioned, the Germans gradually went to the rear of the 10th Army located in the southern part of the boiler. On the 27th, units of the 29th motorized division were thrown forward from Slonim. The idea was to create an "anvil" at the crossings on the Shara and hold out until the main forces arrived. Here the Germans got carried away again. Still, the two battalions that made up the group traveling to the Shara were too small for such an ambitious task. Both battalions were surrounded and struggled to make their way back to the southeast. Due to the general chaos, we don't even know who saved the remnants of the 3rd Army. It is believed that the remnants of the 6th mechanized corps played the role of the god from the car. If so, then the defeated unit struck a real blow from the grave. But the 3rd Army did not rely solely on the help of its neighbors. Inspired by the courage of despair, the remnants of the army struck a series of attacks against the lining up German defenses. And pierced them! The remnants of the 11th Mechanized Corps Mostovenko were in the lead in the struggle for crossings across swamps and rivers. The German "anvil" split into several foci. Long columns of people and equipment flowed to the east through the wide swampy floodplain of Zelvyanka. Crossing Zelvyanka, the 3rd Army split in two. The army command and the remnants of the 11th mechanized corps went to the east, the command of the 4th corps turned southeast to Slonim, not yet knowing that he had been captured. Accordingly, their fate also developed: the column that turned to Slonim died, and the one that went with Kuznetsov and Mostovenko survived. She made her way to Novogrudok, knocking down another barrier along the way. Without equipment, with a mass of wounded, but alive.
Golubev with his 10th Army went through an equally difficult path. The general began by gathering the remnants of his forces into a compact group, subduing the remnants of the broken mechanized corps of Akhlyustin and conducting reconnaissance of the path. I must say that this reconnaissance turned out to be so effective that Heydorn, a German researcher of the history of the Belarusian boilers, even suggested that Golubev had reconnaissance and communications aircraft in the boiler. The group, marching "hedgehog", literally split 134 German divisions, which was blocking the way. On the morning of June 27, the remnants of the mechanized corps attacked another division on the march. A fairly powerful group with armored vehicles and even artillery was breaking from Volkovysk to Zelva. It is curious that Russians often hung flags with a swastika on the roofs of cars. This should have confused (and often really confused) the German aviators. It was a wild race. The breakthroughs were supposed to reach the crossings over Zelvyanka and Shchara before the large forces of the Germans, and shoot down the barriers before the cauldron was properly compressed. German aviation went over the heads. Wrecked cars and tanks were thrown off the road. Some withdrew from the main line of retreat and managed to break into the Pinsk swamps. In particular, the commander of the 7th Panzer Division, Borzilov, went deep there with the remnants of his men. Most of Golubev's army fell into these battles. The Germans constantly erected new redoubts on its way, aviation knocked out transport and even armored vehicles. Only a few managed to break through. Among these few was Golubev himself.
On June 30, near the village of Klepachi, a battle of a detachment of Russians emerging from the encirclement against a German ambush took place. Local residents told the researcher D. Yegorov, who had already interrogated them in our time, how during this collision a Soviet tank was destroyed with a hand grenade. The explosion of ammunition did not follow: they were not left. The dead commander of the 6th mechanized corps Mikhail Khatskilevich was removed from the wrecked tank. This is how the combat path of a powerful mechanized corps ended a week ago.
The breakthrough on June 30 was the last hit. After that, the Germans cleaned out the Bialystok cauldron. But the torment of those who broke through Zelvyanka and Shara did not end. Coming out to the Novogrudok area, they found that they had fallen from one boiler into another.
Shchara. These thirty-fours got stuck in the crossing. At first they tried to cross the bridge on the left, it broke down, and the tankers tried to cross the river along the bottom. The arrows and the inscription were drawn by the owner of the original photo.
Kobrin street
Without fear and hope. Storming of Minsk.
The wound is not here, but where!
No matter how badly the events developed in the Bialystok ledge, the troubles were just beginning. The cauldron in the ledge was "infantry", its northern claw was the 9th Field Army. But there was also a deep penetration of the 3rd tank group, which was marching practically in the void between the Western and North-Western fronts, which had lost their elbow connection. There was practically nothing to close this hole. The rifle units of the ZF on foot simply did not have time to reach the section of the breakthrough. However, the unfinished deployment created a kind of unplanned reserves. One of these reserves was the 44th Rifle Corps. On June 23, the corps passed Minsk in echelons. The city was bombed at that time, so hard that without any street fighting, the infrastructure of the Belarusian capital was paralyzed on the 24th, and the city itself was seriously destroyed. The 44th sk, having passed the burning Minsk, created a barrier. The corps was reinforced by machine-gun battalions in bunkers on the outskirts of the city, but its position was extremely precarious: there were no neighbors from the flanks at all, and the corps front was very long.
Horrors were happening in Minsk. A lot of refugees have accumulated in the city. Due to the bombing, the water supply system did not work, there was no electricity, the transport functioned in jerks, and they did not have time to extinguish the fires. Goth did not feel like getting into street fights. On June 26, the railway to Borisov was cut, that is, the Germans were already to the east. Although the 44th SC repulsed a simultaneously past attack to its positions, this did not change the general nasty tendency. They tried to influence the Germans with aviation, but the fighters tightly covering the Goth army did not allow it to inflict heavy enough losses.
At the end of the day on June 26, the ZF headquarters sent its famous report to the Headquarters: “Up to 1000 tanks are bypassing Minsk from the north-west. There is nothing to resist. " Although "a thousand tanks" is a somewhat exaggerated estimate of the corps that went to Minsk, it is essentially true: Minsk turned out to be an island in a stormy sea of tank and motorized infantry Kampfgroups bypassing it on both sides. It was there and then, by the way, that Gastello died. Those that fought for a few days and even hours, preventing the Germans from completing the encirclement, fought for time. Time required to evacuate civilians, wounded, factory equipment, etc. etc. The main result of Gastello's ramming, in general, is not that he killed someone on the highway, but that the Germans fell on the highway for a few minutes, raking up the mess from the Soviet plane and their cars, and managed to leave Minsk under the falling barrier more people.
On the 27th, the liquid barrier to the north-west of Minsk finally collapsed. Nevertheless, the remnants of this barrier continued to hang on the Panzerdivisions like dogs on the pants of a postman. The 100th Infantry Division, in the future one of the elite formations of the Red Army, even achieved quite significant success: aggressively counterattacking, it interrupted the communications of the 7th Panzer Division for two days, simultaneously overwhelming the veteran of all Wehrmacht campaigns, Colonel Rottenburg. The units, stubbornly unwilling to cover themselves with a white sheet and crawl towards the cemetery, held out for another day. But this could not last forever. On June 28 at 16-00 Minsk was taken. By the 29th, the remnants of the troops defending it rolled back from the outskirts of the destroyed city, some to the east, some to the west.
At the same time, the last counterstrike organized by Pavlov ended. It was a clash in the Lida area of the 21st Rifle Corps with another tentacle of the Goth army stretching towards Minsk. Since the 21st SC was advancing, it so happened, strictly towards the enemy, the clash escalated into an oncoming battle, in which the more maneuverable German corps had all the advantages.
Quite rare, but still found in the 41st year piece - color photo
Boiler near Novogrudok
Now another encirclement loomed, northeast of the first, and west of Minsk. Those units got there that, due to the delay in deployment, simply did not have time to be distributed in the Bialystok salient, and those who rolled back to the east during the struggle in the first cauldron. Guderian lagged behind a little, engaged in the war against the breakthrough army of Golubev, and now he was making up for lost time. On June 29, his group established contact with the army of Goth. With great joy, the Germans slightly shot each other (they did not immediately know their own). However, Fast Heinz was somewhat disappointed: it was not he who entered Minsk. Therefore, Guderian, with no hesitation, threw part of his forces further east, towards Borisov. Goth was slightly furious. He himself created a solid northern wall of the boiler from Lida to Minsk. And Guderian, in the space from Baranovichi to the same Minsk, left his forces completely insufficient, so now the Russians flowed through the holes found in the direction of the Pripyat swamps, to Slutsk and to the south. Those who, after leaving the Bialystok cauldron, still had the strength to go further, made their way there. Moreover, at first, the Russians did not even retreat with battles, but calmly left the encirclement in motorized columns (Gotha's air reconnaissance reported, for example, about a ten-kilometer convoy of trucks). Guderian's actions triggered the appearance on the scene of Army Group Commander von Bock with a king-size strap-on. Fast Heinz was reminded of his main task.
Meanwhile, changes have taken place in the boiler. Since the German infantry was still stomping on foot from the west, or even cleaning up the Bialystok cauldron, the encircled people had some time to organize a breakthrough. These events were headed by Vasily Kuznetsov, without exaggeration, the most powerful commander of the Soviet side in the Belarusian battle. The need to break through the cauldron a second time did not discourage this commander. The breakthrough began on the night of July 2 and was Kuznetsov's brilliant operation. The Russians broke through the barrier erected on their way by the 17th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht. Moreover, those leaving the encirclement even took prisoners and trophies along the way (sic!). A few days later they fought their way east at Rogachev. In mid-July, Mostovenko also got out of the bag with the remnants of his group. I must say that when we remember the masses of prisoners of the summer of 1941, we should not forget about the other side: thousands of people stubbornly walking east along the enemy's rear, feeding on pasture for weeks, sleeping on damp ground (literally damp, swamps all around ) - and all this without any confidence in success.
For Kuznetsov, this environment was not the last. In September, the general fell into the infamous Kiev cauldron. And he also burst out of it. Further on his way there were many entourage, but Vasily Ivanovich's role in them was already different: it was, for example, Stalingrad. And in the 45th year, the gods of war grinned at the general with all their teeth: his soldiers took the Reichstag. But this is all in the future, but for now ...
The Novogrudok cauldron survived until July 8. On this day, in the operational report of the Center group, the words “The battles for Bialystok and Minsk are over” were heard.
Captivity
results
The success of the battle in Belarus led the German commanders to a state of certain euphoria. On July 3, the chief of the German General Staff, Halder, wrote literally: "It would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia has been won within 14 days." The achievement was indeed very significant. The natural next move of the Germans was to exploit the breakthrough. Two tank groups stretched out in a brood of snakes in the direction of Smolensk. On the way, they repulsed another counterattack of the Soviet mechanized corps. The mobile battle at Senno and Lepel was brief, fierce and sad for the Red Army. Two mechanized corps, which jumped out to meet the advancing, in fact, repeated the fate of Boldin's group that fought against a stronger enemy.
In total, 341,073 Soviet soldiers and officers were killed and taken prisoner in the battle for Belarus. These are very high numbers, defeats in encirclement battles later rarely yielded such dire results. Even large boilers like Uman or Melitopol were much smaller in scale. It seems that only Kiev and Vyazma have surpassed the gloomy record of Belarusian boilers. The losses of the German side were significantly lower. I never managed to get to the bottom of any exact figures, there is only incomplete data and only for June (Soviet losses are also given for the first ten days of July). Approximate estimates are given by about 15 thousand dead soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht.
If the shooters preferred to quietly make their way through the forests, tankmen often tried to break out of the encirclement in their vehicles. The transport columns of the Wehrmacht periodically found themselves in the company of lonely brutal "Rusish Panzer". Photo from the archive of a German grandfather, whose last name I have forgotten. BT jumped onto the convoy and drove along it until he was knocked out by grenades.
Doubtful crime, undoubted punishment
Dmitry Pavlov saw neither the battle at Lepel, nor the battle of Smolensk that followed. He was arrested on 4 July, along with a group of commanders of the Western Front, which included the chief of staff of the Klimovskys and the chief of artillery Klych. Since the commander of the aviation of the front shot himself, the commander of the 9th air division of Chernykh appeared before the tribunal. The generals were convicted and shot after a short investigation. At first, Pavlov and his group were made to betray, but in the course of the investigation the version of the conspiracy disappeared, and as a result, the wording remained "showed cowardice, inaction, indiscriminateness, allowed the collapse of command and control." Now, when we are able to assess the situation relatively calmly, having in our hands a relatively large amount of information, we can say: Pavlov did not deserve to be shot. Moreover. The specific decisions of the unfortunate front commander were quite rational, at the level of awareness that he had. Yes, he ignored the threat from Brest for a long time. But what reason did he have to believe that there was any threat there? As soon as reconnaissance revealed the real forces and intentions of the enemy on the captured maps, the reaction of the commander of the Zapfront followed immediately and was absolutely correct. The decision to counterstrike with Boldin's group is quite classical. And, I must say, more intelligent than the actions of Pavlov's colleague, Kirponos, on the South-Western Front. Besides. Even if Pavlov were a military genius, you inevitably come to the conclusion that with the initial balance of forces in the ZAPOVO zone and the delayed deployment, the collapse of the Western Front was simply inevitable. The first item in the list of answers to the question "who is to blame?" - the enemy. GA "Center" simply had more people, these people were, on average, much better trained and at least no worse equipped than the soldiers and officers of the Western Front. The smearing of the forces of ZAPOVO in depth made the programmed defeat a programmed beating. But Pavlov is not responsible for this smear. The decision to start mobilization and deployment is not only military, but also political; not only the front commander on the spot, but even the chief of general staff or the people's commissar of defense cannot make it arbitrarily. In particular, the decree on mobilization is signed by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. That is, a mistake that seriously aggravated the failure was made by the country's political leadership and personally I.V. Stalin.
I must outline two theses: on the one hand, it was extremely difficult for the leader to avoid this mistake (the enemy consciously and skillfully worked to ensure that it was made), on the other hand, it was he who made the mistake. Knowing what kind of seething shit is always caused by the name of Stalin in any context, please take into account: my personal attitude to the IVS is secondary and tertiary here. As a naturalist: I write what I see. In general, it can be stated that Pavlov fell victim to a more emotional reaction than a sober reflection on the situation. I would like to note that in the future, the country's top political leadership became obsessed, and similar stories did not happen again. Even D.T. Kozlov, after the catastrophe of the Crimean Front in 1942, relatively quietly and peacefully went to command the army, and then, unable to cope with this, was exiled to the Far East.
The front air force leadership was unable to establish any meaningful counterplay. Kopets did not rise to the occasion, but hardly anyone, including Kopets himself, could have predicted this before the war. In any case, he answered for his mistakes on the evening of June 22 to a judge much more serious than anyone else.
Gloomy realities of the Patriotic. Soldiers of the field gendarmerie battalion finish shooting the wounded.
Why?!
Naturally, the main question is why the Red Army suffered a catastrophe so quickly and deafeningly, if the USSR was consciously preparing for war for a long time. Often, publicists and historians dealing with this issue focus on one reason. Meanwhile, the truth is that the Red Army collapsed for more than one reason, it collapsed for all reasons at once. In Belarus in 1941 and on the Soviet-German front in general, the Wehrmacht had a number of advantages. This is the numerical superiority in people, as well as the quantity and quality of transport. This is anticipation of mobilization and deployment. This is combat experience and, in general, a better trained armed forces. Taken together, this did not give the Red Army a chance to successfully conduct a border battle, even if Pavlov was an unsurpassed strategic genius. At the same time, the Red Army showed character and fought more successfully than our allies. Our national pride, of course, is not flattered by the loss ratio of ~ 25: 1 in the Bialystok-Minsk boiler. But you need to understand that this is the best that the anti-Hitler coalition was able to demonstrate by the 41st year. The campaign in France (not to mention Poland and the Balkans) ended much more deplorable in terms of the ratio of losses. Moreover, the Allies acted in more favorable starting conditions: for several months there was no active action on the Western Front, so there was no need to talk about preemptive deployment, and the armies of the Benelux, France and Britain acted even with their numerical superiority.
The shock of the first blow was intense. Fortunately, this was not the last battle of the war.
Destroyed armored car of the 20th tank division of the Wehrmacht. Judging by the nature of the damage, it was slapped with shrapnel-fugsan.
For clarity - enough detailed map operations. Cut from the thematic "Front illustration". For some reason, the counterstrike of Boldin's group is not shown, but the rest is quite visible.
FROM BREST TO BERLIN
Poetic epic
Seventeen days - and there is no front! - 1
Crushed, surrounded, crushed.
Will anyone understand, after all, the poet
Can't a thought harness it to the shafts?
A third of a million were taken prisoner.
Guns, tanks, planes -
Do not count! The brain is on one side:
Can't understand why this is so?
One to fifty two -
Our losses! It can not be!
No, this is a mockery of reason!
Frost in the heat goes on the skin!
There were fewer of us, but 2
Guns, tanks, planes -
Almost the same. So what?
They lost all the regiments and companies.
Seventeen days - and the front is broken.
On the seventh day, we already handed over Minsk. 3
And Stalin says angrily:
"Lenin's legacy was given." 4
He said the word more abruptly.
But since mate is inappropriate here,
Then he is modestly replaced here,
Although it would sound more interesting.
Who is slow-witted - on the Internet
Take a look at your leisure
And he will reveal to you a secret:
Will reveal the truth - hurry!
Into two amazing "cauldrons"
Our three armies were hit. 5
These are "high-profile" cases!
This is the "shine" of the Soviet "steel"! 6
How many divisions? Twenty three
Completely defeated by the Soviet.
Wipe a tear, country, from your face,
Light, sadness, candles in the temples.
In my soul - confusion and anger,
And in the heart of fury throws arrows,
And our eternal Russian question:
"Who is to blame and what should we do?"
Joseph Stalin: “Shoot
All the leadership of the front! Urgently!
To level the ground with Pavlov. 7
Right, Tymoshenko, am I? " - "Yes sir!" eight
And only our fortress "Brest"
She did not surrender on the southern flank: 9
Then the fire thundered around,
Driving our rage into the Germans.
A year later, for the first time news of her
Through the prisoners, we got into our hands:
The country recognized - the fortress "Brest"
It sparkled with fire until August.
Seven thousand surrendered - alas! -
This is the result of a weeklong fight.
And only four hundred could
Fight for a month without looking back.
And the feat of those who to the end
Stood here to death, became forever
A victorious symbol, in the hearts
Entering the courage of this battle.
So what was the matter here?
How did it happen? What are the reasons?
And why the losses are countless
And the trail of enemy victories is so long?
Alas, the doctrine has failed! -
Not to the defense - to the offensive
She called out resolutely
To beat the enemy in his domain.
A blow to the army inflicted
Before the war, our Stalin himself -
I gave such a "gift"
That the enemies were on their ears:
Afraid of the commanding higher powers -
The coup worried him -
He removed many from their posts
And after that he destroyed it. ten
The leader was sure - he would attack
Germany will not be on us soon:
Once the Pact is signed, it will not work 11
On us in the attack of the enemy pack.
To not give Hitler a reason,
Our General Staff ordered (oh yes, zeal!)
To show the Germans clearly
That we are not preparing for battles:
Airfields - for show.
The war is about to go - no doubt about it -
All the artillery we have
At the summer training camp and training.
Ah, our Russian "maybe"!
"I suppose" is following him:
It was not possible to keep the world,
Restraining an arrogant neighbor.
“Do not open fire in response,
And wait for further instructions. "
“What are they, checkmate rewind! -
Not overheated, for an hour, in the bath? "
Earth from explosions - shaking.
Shells are tearing people everywhere. -
“Do not respond with fire.
Maybe we can still settle it. "
The commanders shout:
"Let us answer with fire!"
And permissions rush to them
After three hours for these requests:
While deciding what, what;
The Politburo was assembled in the Kremlin;
Von Schulenburg is coming; to him 12
Towards - Molotov. “Attacked! -
Returning, he urgently reported -
The Germans declared war on us ”. -
Stalin swallowed his tongue,
After all, it must be how he was shaved off!
How Hitler deceived him! -
After all, he assured me not long ago: 13
"There will be no war." And butted
Below the belt is insidious.
“How he dodged him, you scoundrel! -
The great Stalin miscalculated!
Is silent. And Zhukov finally
Burst into his silence:
"I propose to the enemy
Unleash the fire decisively
And hold it back while
He did not go after our souls. "
“No, - Tymoshenko says, -
Do not detain, but destroy! "
“Let's give a directive. To be
Now your way. " And what?
In response to the Stalinist "Yes",
The cipher code goes to the troops:
"To smash the fascists." But when?
When the drama is in full swing:
When the border is on fire
And the artillery is broken
And aviation is doubly
And the mass of our bat tanks.
Here is Stalin's order for you -
War would not be called - quieter than a mouse
Be at the border, for show
To present the troops to the gaze from above.
As a result, the enemy attacked us
Insidious, mean and cruel
And drove our armies
The "boilers" are huge in the end.
Everything is so, but Pavlov is like himself
I behaved before the attack
And in the days of the war? We know
Not in the best way. Without zeal
He carried out orders from above.
And the impression is created -
I ignored them and gave them up,
Essentially, your front in an instant.
Received twice in June
Signal from the General Staff - to be ready:
"The war is about to happen." - I was waiting for something
And he had fun in the harsh hour:
Before the attack Pavlov where? -
In the theater, he sits in the box. fourteen
“What a performance! - On high!
How Popandopulo plays!
Ah, Yashka! Ay, artilleryman!
What feints he does!
Here is a fiery artist!
How famously he amuses us!
And this bastard! So cute
And how wonderful she dances with him!
To hell with military affairs! -
How lovely life is to music! "
They report to him there:
"It is very alarming at the border." -
“More provocations? Bedlam".
He does not want to leave the theater.
Tymoshenko himself called
Him to the theater. “Oh, evil lot!
No, I will finish the show, ”I decided.
What a hero! What a will!
The front did not raise the alarm.
The troops did not occupy the trenches,
Didn't turn around. The enemy crushed them.
Such is our sad experience.
How could they not have been captivated? -
The Bialystok ledge itself asks
Strike from the flanks, tear the thread there,
Where to tear it is much easier.
On the southern flank, where Brest is,
Three divisions are sleeping carelessly. 15
They smashed all of them here in an hour -
They burn in the barracks: a moment - and eternity.
And they sleep peacefully in the citadel.
In the evening the Germans observe:
How copper pipes burn
And the guards are inspiring.
Ah, the citadel! - Such a stronghold!
Such power! Such power!
And so mediocre (damn it!)
Then they did it to you!
On the main line to Moscow
You would have closed the way to Smolensk. -
I became a trap at dawn
Seven thousand warriors captured.
This is how we live in Russia -
We create problems for ourselves
And heroically then
We solve them by entering the poems.
But it could not be so.
Having taken up the defense near Brest,
Could fight so that the enemy
He croaked with grief like crows.
And they said - not Moscow,
Smolensk closed the road to the enemy.
Alas, vain words
And belatedly they sound the alarm.
Bottom line - Western Front then
Damage to adjacent fronts:
To the south and north - trouble
At the beginning of this summer battle.
And Kiev fell, and Leningrad
I suffered for three years in the end.
This is one wrong step -
And even the gods will not help.
Shot Pavlov and his 16
Chief of Staff and others too.
Only sixteen years will pass -
They will be whitewashed - Khrushchev will help: 17
Will declare: “Stalin is to blame,
And all the others are his victims. "
It is not for nothing that they sometimes say:
"It is not the gods who lead us, but the devils."
March 3, 2015
----------
1 From June 22 to July 8, 1941, the main forces of the West. front
were surrounded and defeated. From the summary it. Ch. Command of Army Group Center from July 11, 1941: in Bialystok and Minsk "boilers" 324,000 people were taken prisoner, including several senior generals, 3,332 tanks, 1809 guns and many others were captured. war trophies. Our losses: 341,073 hours - irrecoverable and 76,717 sanitary. With him. sides: 6 535 hours killed, 20 071 wounded, 1 111 prop. without a trace. In total, on June 22, 1941, there were 44 divisions in the district. The remaining 20 formations lost, on average, half of their forces and assets, and the front air force lost 1,797 aircraft.
2 The forces of the sides: we have 790 tons of hours, the Germans have 1.45 million hours. We have: 15.1 tons of guns and mortars, 2.1 tons of tanks, 1.7 tons of aircraft. At him. sides: 16.1; 3.8; 2.1 t acc.
3 June 28 approx. 17:00 part of it. 20th tank. divisions broke into Minsk from the northwest.
4 June 28, Stalin, after visiting with members of the Politburo Gen. headquarters told them: "Lenin left us a great legacy, and we, his heirs, all this ... (obscene word)."
5 In Bialystok (June 28, units of the 3rd and 10th armies were surrounded) and Minsk (from June 28 to July 8, the remnants of the 3rd, 10th and parts of the 13th and 4th armies) "boilers" were un-us of 11 str., 2 cavalry, 6 tank and 4 motorized divisions of the Red Army, 3 corps commanders and 2 division commanders were killed, 2 corps corps and 6 division commanders were captured, 1 more corps commander and 2 divisional commanders were missing.
6 In pre-war. years, the march of tankers was popular, in the cat. sang: "Thundering fire, sparkling with the glitter of steel, / Cars will go on a furious campaign, / When Comrade Stalin sends us into battle / And Voroshilov will lead us into battle" (music by Dmitry and Daniel Pokrass, words by Boris Laskin).
7 Commander of the Western Front.
8 People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
9 Fighting continued in the Brest Fortress until the end of June.
Major P.M. Gavrilov, who led the defense of the so-called. "East. fort ", which consisted of 400 soldiers and commanders of the Kr. Army, was
captured wounded among the last on 23 July. According to the testimony of witnesses, the shooting was heard from the fortress until the beginning. Aug 1941 g.
101 Number of repressed in 1937 - 1941 representatives of
higher com. the composition of the Red Army (based on the calculations of O.F.Suvenirova) was 503 out of 767, 65.6% (412 were shot, 29 died in custody, 3 years of life by suicide, 59 returned from prison alive). Including were repressed: 3 out of 5 marshals, 60% (VK Blucher, AI Egorov, MN Tukhachevsky); 20 commanders of the 1st and 2nd rank out of 15, 133% (19 were shot, 1 returned alive from prison); 5 flagships of the 1st and 2nd rank out of 4 fleet flagships, 125% (5 were shot); 69 corps commanders from 62, 112.6% (58 were shot, 4 died in custody, 2 committed suicide, 5 returned from prison alive); 6 flagships of the 1st rank out of 6, 100% (5 were shot, 1 returned alive from prison); 153 divisional commanders from the 201st, 76% (122 were shot, 9 died in custody, 22 returned from prison alive); 247 brigade commanders from 474, 52.1% (201 were shot, 15 died in custody, 1 committed suicide, 30 returned from prison alive).
11 23 Aug 1939 in Moscow, People's Commissar in. cases of the USSR V.M. Molotov and Minister in. Affairs of Germany I. von Ribbentrop signed the Non-Aggression Pact.
13 German Ambassador to Moscow.
14 May 15, 1941 on special. a plane from Berlin to Stalin in Moscow was delivered a letter from Hitler, in the cat. he assured Stalin that Germany was not going to attack the USSR, but to concentrate on it. troops and its allies near the borders with the USSR - this is a distraction to deceive England that Germany is not going to attack her, and the resting place of Germ. army before the attack on England. At the same time, Hitler insidiously warned Stalin that if disobedient to him. generals will start provocative actions against the USSR, then he will punish them.
15 On the evening of June 21, 1941 in Minsk, in the theater of the military district, Pavlov watched the play "The Wedding in Malinovka".
On June 16, com. front gene. Army D.G. Pavlov and other generals. After a short investigation, Pavlov was sentenced to death. Together with him were shot on July 22: early. of the front headquarters of the general-m. V.E. Klimovsky and early. communications of the front of the general - m. A.T. Grigoriev. In the following days, several more high-ranking generals were arrested and shot.
17 July 31, 1957 Military Collegium Top. court of the USSR issued a ruling by which the sentence of July 22, 1941 was canceled
due to newly discovered circumstances, the case was dismissed for lack of corpus delicti. DG Pavlov was posthumously restored to the military rank.
Above is the cover of Vladimir Tyaptin's new book. It includes 39 poems and 14 poems and songs dedicated to the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, which reflect the main battles on all fronts of this great war from the border battles of 1941 to the storming of Berlin and the Victory Day parade in Moscow on June 24, 1945. The book is full of great historical material included in 309 footnotes. In fact, these are two books - poetry and prose, united under one title. It features 156 specific personalities, including 96 war heroes, from rank-and-file soldiers to Marshal Zhukov and Generalissimo Joseph Stalin. The book was designed by the laureate of the State Prize of the Udmurt Republic Yuri Lobanov.
The German command, intoxicated by the success of the French campaign, put forward a new task — the destruction of the USSR in just 3 months.
It seems that for the German military blitzkrieg was the only way to defeat the enemy, and even in their thoughts they did not admit that the war would last more than 3 months ..
The Germans apparently expected that it would be like in France — an easy walk with local pockets of resistance.
DIRECTION SET
The southwestern direction was the main one, but the Wehrmacht did not have the strength to fight simultaneously in all 3 directions.
Therefore, it was necessary to defeat the Red Army units in the ZF within 3-5 days with one powerful frontal strike ...
Then, to release significant forces, including Guderian's tank army and send them to the southwestern direction ...
Where they would join up with Kleist's tank group and by mid-July they would have taken Kiev by storm.
Such a powerful frontal blow fell primarily on the Bialystok salient.
ABOUT BELOSTOK
On June 17, for 3 hours, the pilot of the ZapOVO district, Colonel Georgy Zakharov, makes a reconnaissance flight on U-2, 400 km over the western border from south to north, with a landing in Bialystok.
Every 30-50 km, he landed at any suitable site, a border guard immediately approached the plane, on the wing Zakharov wrote another report about what he saw, and they all immediately went to the General Staff as well.
And the pilot saw the same everywhere:
“Areas to the west of the state border are packed with troops. In the villages, in the farmsteads, in the groves, tanks, armored vehicles, guns, poorly disguised or even without disguise ... The number of troops left no doubt: ... war is approaching ... From day to day. "
JUNKERS CONDUCTS EXPLORATION OF BELOSTOK
“On May 15, 1941, the German off-flight aircraft Ju-52 was completely unimpeded by the state border and flew across Soviet territory via Bialystok, Minsk, Smolensk to Moscow.
The air defense did not take any measures to terminate its flight. The posts ... of the ZAPOVO air defense discovered it only after 29 km, but, not knowing the silhouettes of German aircraft, they took it for a regular DS-3 plane and did not notify anyone about the appearance of the off-flight Ju-52. "
The Bialystok airport, knowing that it was Junkers after all, ... also did not inform ... the air defense, since the connection with them had been cut off by the military since May 9.
But they did not restore the connection, but ... litigated with the Bialystok airport about who ... to restore the connection. "
The Moscow air defense leadership also did not know anything about the Junkers, although the duty officer on May 15 received a notification from the Civil Air Fleet dispatcher that the off-flight aircraft had flown over Bialystok.
The command of the Air Force of the spacecraft did not take any measures to terminate the flight. Moreover, knowing that it was a Ju-52, it facilitated its landing in Moscow. No one was punished, no one was removed from office
ARMY OF THE RKKA GROUPED AT BELOSTOK
The Red Army army of 300,000 people ended up on the Bialystok ledge ... it was an ideal position for the Wehrmacht.
The enemy could not wish for more
Taking advantage of the fact that the two armies of the Western Front were concentrated on an offensive basis on the Bialystok salient, the "Center" group launched flank attacks, going deep into the rear Soviet troops and creating on the second day of the war the threat of their encirclement.
Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Commander of the ZAPOVO troops "N503859. It gives the deployment of units of the district, including in the Bialystok ledge.
The commander of the ZF D. Pavlov, before the attack of the Germans, built up the troops on an offensive basis, depriving them of the opportunity to repel the enemy's attack
NOT PREPARING FOR DEFENSE
The commander of the ZF D. Pavlov, before the attack of the Germans, built up the troops on an offensive basis, depriving them of the opportunity to repel the enemy's attack.
Mechanized corps and rifle divisions were pushed to the forefront, which led to their immediate defeat ....
After the change in combat formation, the flanks were sharply weakened and not adapted to repel the threat.
PROVOCATION
On June 21, the Wehrmacht troops entered the border area and .... Received the provocation they desired
While under investigation, General D.G. Pavlov testified that even at 1.00 am on June 22, when Directive No. 1 was already being transmitted to other districts, the ZAPOVO was not notified.
And at 4.00, Pavlov received information from Tymoshenko that German troops were expected to cross the border and that they were ordered not to take any action, not to open artillery fire, but ... .. to conduct aerial reconnaissance on German territory up to 60 km in depth!...
Important facts:
1. People's Commissar of Defense S. Timoshenko deliberately pushed the ZAPOVO to violate the border, which would provide the Germans with arguments in favor of the USSR's readiness to commit an act of aggression.
Despite the fact that the war against the USSR was a decided affair, the Germans still could use a pretext for an attack….
For example, imaginary aggression from the USSR
2. Pavlov recognized (!) The presence of directive number 1, but ... it was his district that did not receive it.
3.Timoshenko warned about border crossing and ... asked not to return fire
4.Only the ZF troops were built on an offensive basis ... the rest of the districts retained their defensive positions
ABOUT MASKING
Camouflage is extremely important during hostilities, it is it that actually saves the main forces of the armies from an enemy strike
However, Tymoshenko did everything contrary to his own instructions.
On June 18, 1941, a directive from the General Staff and the People's Commissariat, initiated and sanctioned by Stalin personally, went to the troops of the western districts with a warning about an attack by Germany in the coming days and about the need to put the direct cover troops on alert.
However, the next day, June 19, a telegram from the People's Commissar himself is sent to the districts, prescribing the timing of the implementation of combat readiness measures, including camouflage on July 1-5, 1941.
And these are not "the coming days" at all. ...
An important fact:
On June 9, only the People's Commissar Timoshenko's telegram (without Zhukov) ... ..who postpones important preparations for preparing the country for defense until July 1-5 .….
The order came only from the People's Commissar Timoshenko, although it was endorsed from the head of the General Staff (Zhukov's signature is not visible)
HOW IT WAS
Grechanichenko Vladimir Alekseevich, chief of staff of the 94th cavalry regiment, 6th cavalry division recalled:
“In the morning I had to check the regiment's readiness for equestrian competitions, which were to take place on June 22.
At about 3:30 a.m. the regiment's telephone operator on duty called me at my apartment and said that a combat alert had been announced to the regiment, but with a strange addition:
“To be in full combat readiness, but not to take people out of the barracks (!)”.
At the entrance to the military town, I met with the commander of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Petrosyants, also raised by alarm.
On the way to headquarters, we exchanged views on a strange combat alert. On the parade ground of the town, a group of commanders, their political officers and chiefs of staff of the 48th cavalry and 35th tank regiments of our division were stationed in the same town with us.
It turned out that they had already called the division headquarters, but the officer on duty at the headquarters confirmed the previously transmitted order. They tried to contact one of the divisions of the divisional headquarters, but here they said that everyone at a meeting with the divisional commander, Major General M.P. Konstantinov. "
Here's the sequel:
“Everything fell into place when fascist bombs fell on the town. The air strike on the town was combined. After a massive bombardment, enemy cover fighters flew in, firing from large-caliber machine guns fighters and commanders running out of the barracks, horses tied to the hitching posts.
Here the meaning of the phrase from the order on combat alert was highlighted:
“Do not take people out of the barracks” ...
I am far from thinking that the enemy, even a deeply conspiratorial one, who was sitting in the division headquarters, could risk transmitting such an order.
Most likely, a saboteur could have done this by connecting to telephone lines that openly passed along the city street. "
An important fact:
Grechanichenko does not want to admit the thought that there were traitors inside the headquarters ... he would rather believe in a saboteur who connected to the telephone line.
It was necessary to arrange so that unarmed soldiers were killed right in the barracks ..
Now Grechanichenko turns to the most important thing. To Bialystok:
“As a result, the regiment suffered significant losses. But we still managed to maintain control. The personnel concentrated on the assembly point in the Gelchinsky forest, three kilometers south of the military town.
By about 10 o'clock on June 22, we entered into contact with the enemy. A firefight ensued ... An attempt by the Germans to break through to Lomza on the move was repulsed (!).
The 48th cavalry regiment held the defense to the right. At 23:30 on June 22, by order of the corps commander, Major General I.S. Nikitin, units of the division in two columns forced a march towards Bialystok.
The enemy did not give rest - all the time he was bombarding us. We walked a distance of 75 kilometers without stopping. The marching columns put themselves in order on the move. There was no time for rest.
By 17 o'clock on June 23, the division was concentrated in a forest area 2 kilometers north of Bialystok. "
“We made a quick march of 35 kilometers. We went to the copses, which is 3 kilometers south of the city. Here they took up a defensive position on a wide front along the Sokolka-Bialystok railway.
Our regiment, reinforced by one battery of the 15th Cavalry Artillery Division, was ordered at 16 o'clock on June 24 to act as a forward detachment of the division along the Verkholesye, Zhuki, Sidra route and by sequentially seizing the indicated lines to ensure the division's advance in the direction of Grodno. Her main forces were to follow our route.
The leading detachment of the regiment was 1 saber squadron reinforced by a platoon of heavy machine guns under the command of Senior Lieutenant F. Lipko.
He successfully completed his task. At about 21:00 on June 24, the squadron came into contact with the enemy in the Biebrza River valley south of Sidra. The regiment commander brought artillery into battle to support the lead detachment .
The enemy could not withstand (!) The onslaught and retreated across the river. At the same time, his artillery opened fire .
Grechichenko's worst hours:
“The day of June 25 was for the regiment, and for the entire division, the darkest day. Starting at dawn, German artillery opened massive fire to the entire depth of the regiment's battle formation.
Enemy aircraft constantly patrolled in the air at low altitude. She inflicted bomb strikes even on small groups of our troops, and cover fighters chased after every (!) Person…. I have not seen anything like this in the four years of the war.
Already in the first hours, all our heavy weapons were disabled, the radio station was broken, communications were completely paralyzed. The regiment suffered heavy losses, was tightly pressed to the ground, and was deprived of the opportunity to conduct any active actions. Lieutenant Colonel N.G. Petrosyants. I assumed command of the regiment, or rather, its remnants.
There was no contact with the division headquarters, and at the end of the day, at my own peril and risk, I decided to withdraw the remnants of the divisions behind the Sokolka-Bialystok railway line. At about 21 o'clock, the deputy commander of the division, Lieutenant Colonel Trembich, appeared in our office, who was also looking for the division headquarters.
He said that some units were withdrawing to Volkovysk across the Ross River. He ordered me to gather all the fighters and commanders leaving the battle and, if we did not establish contact with the division headquarters by midnight, retreat to Volkovysk.
At midnight, about 300 people gathered - ours and 48 cavalry regiments. The group of fighters and commanders of the 48th regiment was headed by senior lieutenant Y. Govronsky, whom I knew personally. There were other commanders among those gathered. After consulting, we made a collective decision to retreat to the Krynki metro station.
A group of commanders categorically insisted on retreating to Volkovysk.
In the end, everyone agreed with this. As soon as dusk fell, they moved to the border of the Ross River, hoping to unite with their own here.
At dawn on June 27, they approached Volkovysk. Here we met a group of commanders who accompanied Marshal G.I. Kulik. He listened to my report and ordered me personally to lead my group along the field road to the Ross River and organize a defense on its right bank north of Volkovysk.
But even here we did not find any military units. Cars, tractors, carts, crowded with people, moved by in a continuous stream. We tried to stop the military who were traveling and walking with the refugees. But no one wanted to listen to anything. Sometimes shots were fired in response to our demands.
Everyone had already argued that Slonim had already been occupied, that German troops had landed in front, the barriers of the tanks that had broken through, that there was no point in defending here. And on June 28, as soon as the sun rose, the enemy aircraft began a general processing of the shores of Russia and the Volkovysk region.
In fact, on this day, the military formations of the formations and units of the 10th army finally ceased to exist. Everything was mixed and rolled to the east.
Both among the military and among the refugees, persistent rumors circulated that our main forces were concentrated on the old state border. And everyone aspired to go there as best they could and as much as they could.
However, these rumors did not come true. When our small group reached the old border on the afternoon of June 30, the same chaos reigned here as on the banks of the Rossi. Minsk was already occupied by the Germans.
All copses were packed with cars, carts, hospitals, refugees, scattered units and groups of our retreating troops, who were surrounded.
Here I met with Colonel S.N. Selyukov, who was the deputy commander of the 108th Infantry Division and whom I had known since the pre-war period. With his assistance, we were included in the cover group for the impending breakthrough from the encirclement.
It was organized by the commander of the 3rd army, Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov and was carried out on the night of 1 to 2 July in a southeast direction through railroad Baranovichi - Minsk between Fanipol station and Volchkovichi junction. The core of those breaking through were the remnants of 64 and 108 rifle divisions. The breakthrough was only partially successful.
Not everyone who participated in it escaped the encirclement. Our cover group was cut off from the breakout site and defeated. Many died in an unequal battle, many were captured. I managed to avoid both. In the darkness of the night, I crawled to the forest.
In May 1942 he became a partisan, in May 1943 he was appointed commissar of the partisan detachment, and in April 1944 - commissar of the 1st Belarusian Cavalry Partisan Brigade. He ended the war in May 1945 with the rank of lieutenant colonel. "
CATASTROPHE
On June 24, a tragedy broke out on the Bialystok ledge, in all the first days 7 "boilers"
On June 26, fighting began on the near approaches to Minsk. General DG Pavlov signed an order for the retreat of the armies of his front.
Only the 13th Army will be able to escape. The 3rd and 10th were stuck tight, and the 4th ... Her remains were lost in the Pripyat forests.
Marshals G.I.Kulik (traitor) and B.M.Shaposhnikov did not help either. ..
Everything is crumbling ... It's scary to talk about losses, there are only five tanks left in the 17th mechanized corps ... ... there is no ammunition, no fuel, no food.
CONCLUSION
Ideal conditions were created for the command of the Wehrmacht so that they could defeat an entire front in 2-3 days.
Bialystok-Minsk battle- border battle on the central sector of the Soviet-German front during the Great Patriotic War June 22 - July 8, 1941. As a result of the battle, the main forces of the Soviet Western Front were surrounded and partially defeated, partially deserted, partially went to the partisans, and partially were captured. On June 28, German troops took Minsk.
The plans and forces of the parties
Germany
The German command delivered the main blow in the Moscow direction with the forces of Army Group Center (commanded by Field Marshal F. von Bock) and the 2nd Air Fleet (General Field Marshal A. Kesselring). On June 22, 1941, the total number of 1,453,200 soldiers and officers (50 divisions), 1,700 tanks, 910 aircraft, 3,000 guns.
- 3rd Panzer Group (2 army and 2 motorized corps, 4 tank, 3 motorized and 4 infantry divisions in total), advancing from the Suwalki area.
- 2nd Panzer Group (3 motorized and 1 army corps, 5 tank, 3 motorized, 1 cavalry, 6 infantry divisions and 1 reinforced regiment), advancing from the Brest region.
The plan was to strike with strong flank groupings with a relatively weak center. The 2nd and 3rd groups were to join up and encircle the Soviet troops west of Minsk. At the same time, infantry formations (a total of 7 army corps, 20 infantry divisions), brought together in two armies, were attacking the encirclement and were to unite east of Bialystok.
- 4th Army advancing from the Brest area
- The 9th Army was advancing from the Suwalki area.
The creation of "double ticks" was the favorite tactic of the Wehrmacht throughout the 1941 campaign.
The German 3rd Panzer Group (commanded by Colonel General G. Goth) inflicted the main blow in Lithuania in order to defeat the Soviet troops stationed there and go behind the Soviet Western Front. On the very first day, the motorized corps reached the Neman and captured the bridges in Alytus and Merkin, after which they continued their offensive on the eastern bank. The battle for Alytus between the combat detachments of the German 39th Motorized Corps and the Soviet 5th Panzer Division turned out to be one of the most difficult for the 39th Motorized Corps in the entire war.
Operating to the south, the German 9th Army (commanded by Colonel General A. Strauss) attacked the Soviet 3rd Army (commanded by Lieutenant General V.I.Kuznetsov) from the front, threw it back and occupied Grodno the next day. A counterattack by the Soviet 11th Mechanized Corps near Grodno was repulsed on the first day of the war.
At the front of the Soviet 10th Army, the enemy conducted diversionary actions, however, on the southern face of the Bialystok salient, three corps (in the first echelon) of the German 4th Army (commanded by Field Marshal G. von Kluge) dealt a crushing blow in the direction of Belsk. The three Soviet rifle divisions defending here were driven back and partially dispersed. At noon on June 22, in the Bransk region, the Soviet 13th mechanized corps, which was in the stage of formation, entered into battle with German troops. By the end of the day, Soviet troops were driven out of Bransk. The next day there was a battle for this city. After repelling Soviet counterattacks on June 24, German troops continued their offensive and occupied Belsk.
On June 23, units of the Soviet 14th mechanized corps and the 28th rifle corps of the 4th army counterattacked German troops in the Brest region, but were driven back. German motorized corps continued their offensive on Baranovichi and in the Pinsk direction and occupied Pruzhany, Ruzhany and Kobrin.
The German 20th Army Corps was temporarily forced to take up defensive positions, but the remaining German corps of the 9th Army (8th, 5th and 6th) continued to cover the main forces of the Soviet army in the Bialystok salient. In view of the failure of the counterattack and the actual start of the encirclement by 20:00 on June 25, IV Boldin gave the order to stop the attacks and begin the retreat.
Bialystok boiler
The Bialystok ledge, in which the Soviet troops were located, was in the shape of a bottle with a neck to the east and relied on the only Bialystok-Slonim road. At the same time, all the headquarters of the 10th Army formations by the beginning of the war were located west of the Bialystok line:
- 1st Rifle Corps - Vizna
- 5th Rifle Corps - Zambrow
- 6th Mechanized Corps - Bialystok
- 13th Mechanized Corps - Belsk
- 6th Cavalry Corps - Lomza.
The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat manuals. In Poland and in the West, we could afford certain liberties and deviations from statutory principles; this is now unacceptable.
On July 1, 1941, units of the 4th German Army entered into contact with units of the 9th Army, completing the complete encirclement of Soviet troops retreating from the Bialystok salient.
On July 3, the command over the infantry divisions of the 4th Army was taken over by the headquarters of the 2nd Army (commanded by Colonel-General M. von Weichs, who, along with the commander of the 9th Army A. Strauss, led the German troops at the final stage of the battle). The 4th Army of Field Marshal G. von Kluge, to which the 2nd and 3rd Panzer Groups were operatively subordinate, continued the offensive to the east.
Fighting continued in the Brest citadel until the end of June. On June 29, German aviation dropped two 500-kilogram bombs and one bomb weighing 1800 kilograms on the Eastern Fort (the last center of resistance of the Soviet troops). The next morning, the headquarters of the German 45th Infantry Division reported on the complete capture of the Brest Fortress. The division announced the capture of 7,000 prisoners, including 100 officers, with its own losses of 482 killed (including 32 officers) and more than 1,000 wounded (more than 5% of the total killed on the entire Eastern Front by June 30, 1941).
Defense of Minsk and Minsk "boiler"
Meanwhile, the German motorized corps advancing eastward on June 24 came across the second echelon of the Soviet Western Front. The 47th motorized corps of the German 2nd Panzer Group collided with three Soviet divisions in the Slonim area, which detained it for a day, and the 57th motorized corps of the 3rd Panzer Group collided with the 21st Rifle Corps in the Lida area.
At this time, the German 39th motorized corps, advancing in the operational emptiness, on June 25 came to the approaches to Minsk. Three tank divisions (7th, 20th and 12th) broke through to the capital of Belarus, up to 700 tanks in total, the next day they were joined by the 20th motorized division. On June 26, Molodechno, Volozhin and Radoshkovichi were occupied. The 7th German Panzer Division bypassed Minsk from the north and headed towards Borisov. On the night of June 27, her advance detachment occupied Smolevichi on the Minsk-Moscow highway.
Minsk was defended by the 44th rifle corps of divisional commander V. A. Yushkevich, who took the positions of the Minsk fortified area, as well as the 2nd rifle corps (commanded by Major General A. N. Ermakov); in total, there were 4 Soviet rifle divisions in the Minsk region. June 27 command over the troops defending