What can be cooked from squid: fast and tasty

From July 5 to August 8, the 4th Shock was part of the 2nd Baltic Front. With the transition back to the 1st Baltic Front, we received the task - together with the 43rd Army to bypass the troops of the 16th German Army in the area of ​​​​the city of Bauska. In this zone there were five, full-blooded enemy divisions, occupying four lines of defense.

For the first ten days, the army troops successfully pursued the enemy, and by mid-September they had advanced more than 70 kilometers in depth along the entire 100-kilometer front.

At the end of the battle in the Siauliai area, the head of the operational department ordered me to go there and evaluate the work of our self-propelled guns, describing the traces of their "blanks" left on the armor of the wrecked "tigers".

It must be said that the Germans threw hundreds of tanks into battle, which burned and crumbled under the fire of our artillery. I found heaps of smoking twisted metal. The front moved back by that time by 2-3 kilometers.

Walked around a dozen broken cars. Attracted the attention of the "tiger", which was standing in a small bush. He was without a tower. It took me some time to figure out how to go around the bushes around the burning tank. Finally, I noticed a ruined turret about 30 meters from the tank.

The Riga operation as a whole took a month. But the 4th Shock participated in it for only ten days. According to the directive of the Headquarters of September 24, the command of our army surrendered its offensive zone in the Riga direction to the 22nd Army of the 2nd Baltic Front.

For several days, being in the reserve of the 1st Baltic Front, our army prepared for an offensive in the direction of Akmene - Ezere in cooperation with the 6th Guards Army. The 4th Shock Force again found itself in a special position - it covered the main strike group of the front's troops on the right flank.

The offensive began on October 7 with the forces of three rifle corps (60, 14 and 83). The Kazan 334th division was part of the 60th Corps. From the operational report of the headquarters of this corps, I learned that already on the first day of the offensive, the Kazan division repelled seven counterattacks by infantry and enemy tanks.

By October 10, the army reached the Auce-Mazeikiai line. The headquarters was on the move. Often we stopped at the farms for one and a half or two days. Sometimes, as soon as you collect the necessary data and sit down at the Combat Log, how the team should prepare for the move.

From the first days of the offensive, the political department of the army began to receive data on the heroism of the personnel. So, senior sergeant Pyotr Nikitovich Shilov, commander of the reconnaissance headquarters battery of the artillery regiment, saving the life of the commander, lieutenant colonel Egorov, rushed with a grenade under the tracks of the "panther". He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the same artillery regiment, division commander Nikolai Gavrilovich Minaev saved hundreds of lives of soldiers of the rifle regiment. It so happened that up to 15 armored personnel carriers broke through to the rear of Minaev’s division, which were supported by fire from tanks. The gunners fought a hard battle for more than an hour, and when the forces were exhausted, Minaev called the fire of the battery on himself. Around the place of his death were more than two hundred corpses of enemy soldiers and officers. He was also posthumously awarded the Order of Lenin and the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Great joy was brought by the news that on October 10, in the Palanga region, the 5th Guards Tank Army broke through to the coast of the Baltic Sea and cut off the land communications of Army Group North.

However, the Germans held Memel (Klaipeda) until January 1945. Only at the end of January the city and the port were taken by the troops of the 4th Shock Army. After the Germans surrendered Riga, the command of the Army Group "North" organized a mobile defense along the entire front, quickly used the roads, trying at all costs to prevent our troops from wedging in, especially the 4th Shock and 6th Guards armies.

Additional forces and firepower are being transferred to their line. That is why the offensive of the 84th Corps on Ezere, which began on October 16, was not successful. Continuous counterattacks, concentrated artillery strikes led to significant losses, and the army commander, General P.F. Malyshev, gave the order to go on the defensive. True, until October 26, attacks were made in separate sectors, but their meaning was determined by the need to keep the enemy in constant tension.

The army command was preparing a new offensive. The conditions were extremely difficult: solid rains and impassability. There seemed to be no end to this phenomenon. And the troops were faced with the task of reaching the banks of the Venta River by the celebration of the 27th anniversary of the October Revolution and firmly gaining a foothold on this frontier.

The offensive began on 27 October. The soldiers of the 334th Kazan and 332nd Ivanovo divisions showed mass heroism and on the eve of the holiday reached a given line in Courland.

These days, the scout of the 158th division, M. V. Yaglinsky, captured 26 Nazis, despite six wounds, he did not leave the battlefield. He was awarded the Order of Lenin and the star of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

Privates of the 1126th regiment of the 334th division Kukhtin and Smirnov crawled up to the German tanks. Each had two anti-tank grenades. Acting skillfully and bravely, they knocked out two enemy tanks. There were many such examples of courage and ingenuity.

January 31 marked the 110th anniversary of the birth of the Soviet military leader, army general, twice Hero of the Soviet Union A.P. Beloborodov. The name of Afanasy Pavlantievich is forever inscribed in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Dozens of newspaper and magazine articles, biographical information in many encyclopedias have been written about him. Finally, many readers know his books “Through the fire and taiga”, “Feat of arms”, “Breakthrough to Harbin”, “Always in battle”. It seems that we know everything about the life and work of A.P. Beloborodov. But…
The author of these lines focused on the unknown and little-known pages of the commander's biography. This was helped by the Russian and Belarusian archives, the memoirs of the commanders of the fronts, under whose command Beloborodov fought, the commander's comrades-in-arms and other little-known sources.
In July 1941, Colonel A.P. Beloborodov was appointed commander of the 78th Rifle Division of the Far Eastern Front. In early November, this division arrived on the Western Front, where, as part of the troops of the 16th Army, it took part in the Battle of Moscow. Parts of the division destroyed dozens of tanks of the 4th German tank group on the outskirts of Moscow. For the heroism shown in the defense of the city of Ruza and the Snigiri railway station, this division was transformed on November 27 into the 9th Guards, and A.P. Beloborodov was awarded the title of Major General
Few people know the assessment of the combat operations of the 78th division by the enemy, who experienced the resilience of the Beloborodovites in his own skin. The report on the battles of the 4th Panzer Group in the period from October 14 to December 5, 1941 contains the following lines: “Behind each water line, the enemy hid in his deep, heavily branched trenches and is waiting for the attackers. Wherever tanks can pass, mines are laid ... Small villages along the highway are turned into real fortresses ... ".
But the focus of our attention will be the combat activities of Afanasy Beloborodov on Belarusian soil in 1943-1944.
With the name of General A.P. Belo-
Borodov is associated with the liberation of Vitebsk on June 25, 1944, when the troops of his 43rd Army of the Baltic Front joined in the Gnezdilovichi area with the troops of the 39th Army of General I.I. Lyudnikov of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In the Vitebsk "cauldron" there were over five divisions and many separate units and subunits of the 3rd German tank army. The total number of German soldiers and officers who fell into this hell was more than 50 thousand people.
Captured Commander
General Golwitzer of the 53rd Army Corps admitted: “It was a beautiful and talented military operation. The Russian army recognized our weak positions."
Few people know that long before the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of the 4th Shock Army under the command of Afanasy Pavlantievich took an active part in the Gorodok operation, and after the liberation of Vitebsk, the 43rd Army also actively participated in the Polotsk operation under his command .
The Gorodok operation of 1943 is an offensive operation of the 1st Baltic Front under the command of Army General Bagramyan in the Gorodok area of ​​the Vitebsk region on December 13-31, 1943. The 11th Army, units of the 4th Shock, 43rd, 3rd Air Armies, 1st, 5th Tank and 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps participated in it. It was planned to defeat the Gorodok grouping of the enemy with counter strikes by the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Army in the direction of the Bychikha station, eliminate the enemy's bridgehead, the so-called Gorodok ledge, and advance in the direction of Vitebsk.
The main blow from the northeast was delivered by the 11th Guards Army of Galitsky, and the auxiliary one, from the west, under the base of the Yezerishchensky ledge, was delivered by the 4th shock army. This task was assigned to the 2nd Guards Rifle and 5th Tank Corps.
45 years after the Gorodok operation, A.P. Beloborodov recalled: “By December 9, units of the 2nd Guards Corps had completed preparations for the Gorodok operation. We received an appropriate order with a revised combat mission and were only waiting for an order indicating the day and hour of the offensive. On December 13, before dawn, such an order was received. At 10.45, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the corps went on the offensive and broke through the enemy defenses in the Malaya Dvornya, Shatiki sector.
In general, the division advanced 4-6 km that day. The combat success of the 47th division immediately affected the entire offensive zone of the 2nd guards corps. And the 47th division, continuing to advance to the east, on December 15 crossed the Nevel-Vitebsk railway and, turning its front to the south, covered the main forces of the corps from enemy counterattacks from Gorodok.
The Gorodok ledge was defended by the German troops of the 3rd Panzer Army of the Army Group "Center" and the southern wing of the 16th Army of the Army Group "North". In order to prevent a breakthrough of the front and the connection of Soviet troops with Belarusian partisans, the German command transferred here 2 infantry divisions from near Leningrad, 5 infantry and 1 tank divisions from the southern wing of Army Group Center.
On December 13, the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies, supported by tanks and artillery, began an assault on enemy positions. The troops of the 4th Army, which included the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of General Beloborodov, broke through the enemy's main line of defense. Many years later, the commander of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, I.Kh.Bagramyan, writes: “In the zone of operations of the 4th shock army, the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps of General A.P. Beloborodov distinguished himself, and especially the 47th Nevelsk Rifle Division of Colonel G.I. .Chernova. She, with a daring blow, together with the tankers of the 24th tank brigade, did not give the enemy the opportunity to gain a foothold on intermediate lines, and by the end of the day she had fully completed her task.
On December 14, on the right flank of the 11th Guards Army, the 1st Tank Corps and the 83rd Guards Rifle Division were brought into battle. On December 16, the 1st Tank Corps reached the Bychikha station area, where it joined up with the 5th Tank Corps of the 4th Shock Army. Parts of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps under the command of General Beloborodov captured about 750 prisoners, 80 guns. 98 mortars, including 18 six-barreled ones, 32 tanks, 8 self-propelled guns, over 650 machine guns, 55 various warehouses and many other military equipment.
In those battles, the 87th, 129th and 211th German infantry divisions were defeated, the 252nd and 20th tank divisions suffered heavy losses. Some of their units and divisions, having broken through the encirclement, hastily rolled back to the south, to Gorodok.
By December 20, more than 500 settlements were liberated. On December 24, the troops of the 11th Guards Army, relying on the successful combat operations of units of the 4th Shock Army and, above all, the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, captured Gorodok and came close to the enemy's Vitebsk fortified area. As for the 4th shock army, it reached the Vitebsk-Polotsk railway on a broad front.
As a result of the Gorodok offensive operation, the troops of the 1st Baltic Front advanced 60 km, defeated 6 enemy infantry and 1 tank divisions, liquidated the Gorodok ledge, and cut the Polotsk-Vitebsk railway. In addition, conditions were created for an offensive in the Vitebsk region.
In May 1944, on the eve of Operation Bagration, Afanasy Pavlantievich was appointed commander of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front. It included the 1st Rifle Corps consisting of the 179th, 306th and 357th divisions, the 60th Rifle Corps consisting of the 235th and 334th divisions, the 92nd Rifle Corps (145th and 204th -I rifle divisions), 156th rifle division, 155th fortified area, 10th and 39th guards tank brigades, 105th tank regiment and other units.
Few people know that the release of Lepel is associated with his name.
Having defeated the enemy groups breaking through from east to west, units of the 1st Rifle Corps and the army mobile group broke into Lepel on the move and by June 28 completely cleared the city of German troops. Irrepressible rage filled the hearts of the soldiers of the 43rd army when they learned that the Nazis killed about 40 thousand Soviet citizens in the concentration camp set up in Lepel.
On July 22, 1944, Lieutenant General Beloborodov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for his skillful leadership of the army troops in breaking through the enemy defenses in the Vitebsk, Polotsk region and forcing the Western Dvina River.
Thus, the liberation in 1944 of many settlements of the Vitebsk region, including Kozyan, Germanovichi, Berezino, Plissa, Glubokoe, Dokshits and, of course, Vitebsk, is associated with the name of Commander-43, Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov.
The first volume of the Encyclopedia of History of Belarus notes that in 1936 A.P. Beloborodov graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. Unfortunately, this edition does not say that in 1926 he graduated from the Nizhny Novgorod Infantry Courses, and in 1929 from the Leningrad Military-Political Courses. F. Engels. The same publication states that since 1957 Afanasy Pavlantievich served as the head of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. The interested reader asks the question, where was A.P. Beloborodov in 1945-1957?
Let's try to answer. After the war, he continued to command the 1st Red Banner Army in the Far East until March 1946. Then Afanasy Pavlantievich in 1946-1947 was the commander of the 5th Guards Army in the Central Group of Forces, assistant to the commander-in-chief of the Central Group of Forces. In 1947, Afanasy Pavlantievich was appointed commander of the Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the Liaodong Peninsula, in the region of Port Arthur and Dalny.
Since 1953, Beloborodov headed the Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces, was the head of the Higher Shooting and Tactical Courses for the Improvement of the Officers of the Soviet Army "Shot" named after B.M. Shaposhnikov, and in 1954-1955 - the chief military adviser to the Ministry of National Defense of Czechoslovakia.
Since October 1955, he served as commander of the Voronezh Military District. Since May 1957, A.P. Beloborodov was not only the head of the GUK of the USSR Ministry of Defense, but also a member of the collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
The combat activity of General Beloborodov was highly appreciated by the famous Soviet commanders G.K. Zhukova, K.K. Rokossovsky, A.M. Vasilevsky, I.Kh.Bagramyan and others.
Afanasy Pavlantievich was an honorary citizen of Irkutsk, Vitebsk and Istra.
In terms of awards, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the Army A.P. Beloborodov was not inferior and even slightly superior to many marshals of the Soviet Union. He was awarded five orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, five Orders of the Red Banner, Suvorov 1st and 2nd degree, Kutuzov 2nd degree, Patriotic War 1st degree, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3- th degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.
According to his will, Afanasy Pavlantievich was buried at the 41st kilometer of the Volokolamsk highway - where in November 1941 the soldiers of his division fought heroically, defending Moscow.

Emmanuil IOFFE, Doctor of Historical Sciences

Chapter Twelve

The results of the hostilities of the 4th shock army

Thus, in early February, the 4th shock army was forced to split its forces in three directions and wage protracted battles with fresh units pulled up by the enemy.

The neighboring armies, lagging behind us by more than 100 km, not only could not help us, but they themselves needed help. The 3rd shock army, stretching along its right border, at that time continued to fight for Kholm and on the outskirts of Velikiye Luki, and the 22nd army, with left-flank units, conducted unsuccessful attacks against the Nazi garrison in the city of Bely. The insecurity of the flanks of the 4th shock army required the expenditure of forces to cover them, especially in the Nelidovo area, and also made it necessary to have significant reserves in case the enemy broke through our front and reached army communications. For these purposes, the 334th Rifle Division was used in full force, which created defenses in the Nelidovo and Ilyino areas.

The two rifle divisions intended to replenish the army - the 155th and 158th - were transferred to the 22nd Army while still on the way, while the 4th shock army, which bore the brunt of several offensive operations in the direction of the main attack, did not receive a single person replenishment. In this regard, the promise once given by the commander of the North-Western Front, Lieutenant General Kurochkin, that if our army manages to break through the enemy’s defenses, it would receive as many reinforcements as requested, looked very strange.

Since February 6, the situation on the army front has stabilized, and the fighting began to be of a private nature.

Thus, the goal of the army operation - reaching the Velizh, Surazh, Demidov region - was achieved, and the fighting on this line not only attracted large enemy strategic reserves (up to six divisions) intended for the spring offensive, but also inflicted serious damage. A convenient springboard for the development of offensive operations in the future was also occupied.

During the period from January 9 to February 5, the troops of the 4th shock army carried out two operations: Toropetsk and Velizh. As a result of the success of these operations, the troops of the army wedged into the junction between the Army Groups "Center" and "North", cutting two rocades: Velikiye Luki - Toropets - Nelidovo - Nevel and Velizh - Dukhovshchina - Yartsevo. The army entered a region that was most advantageous for attacking the flank and rear of enemy troops operating both in the Moscow and Leningrad strategic directions.

An important result of the fighting was the fact that the 4th shock army was much closer to the "triangle" of the Vitebsk-Orsha-Smolensk highways than the Nazi armies operating in the Moscow direction, because the enemy's Rzhev-Vyazma grouping was at a distance of 150-200 km from Smolensk.

The Toropetsk operation was completed exactly on time set by the army. The Velizh operation did not receive full development mainly due to the lagging behind of the neighbors and the insufficient replenishment of the army with personnel, materiel and ammunition.

The further development of the Velizh operation, which immediately followed the Toropetsk operation without a pause, was suspended, I repeat, due to the lagging behind of the neighbors, insufficient replenishment of personnel and extremely poor material support. Even now, with pain in my soul, I am experiencing the fact that the further operation of the 4th shock army, which won victory in the most difficult battles and created a favorable environment for the further development of success in Vitebsk and Smolensk with its deep invasion, stalled because not a single one arrived person to enhance. Is it possible for the front command to treat the organization and conduct of army operations so irresponsibly! And then, and now I am convinced that do not take Comrade from us. Kurochkin of three divisions, but on the contrary, back up with a couple of fresh ones, as promised, then I am sure that both Vitebsk and Smolensk would have been taken, and a different, more difficult situation would have been created for the enemy.

The main thing in the leadership of troops is the ability to maneuver forces and means in order to always be stronger than the enemy in the right direction, creating an opportunity for our troops to realize victory. The command of the North-Western Front, having such capabilities, apparently did not show will.

During the 28 days of the offensive, the troops fought in a straight line 250-300 km, liberated about 3 thousand settlements and a number of cities, among them Peno, Andreapol, Zapadnaya Dvina, Toropets, cut the Velikie Luki-Rzhev railway, inflicted serious damage on large forces the enemy, destroying the 416th and 453rd infantry regiments, the SS Totenkopf cavalry brigade, the reconnaissance detachment of the 123rd infantry division, the 251st and 253rd infantry divisions; inflicted a serious defeat on the 81st, 83rd, 85th and 406th infantry divisions, the 230th reserve infantry division and one division (number not established), which was part of the 59th army corps (in full force thrown against the 4th shock),

10th Infantry Brigade, 547th Infantry Regiment, 579th Landschützbattalion, 50th Separate Battalion, 512th Railway Battalion, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 11th Fighter Detachments with a total strength of up to eight divisions, not counting the enemy units supplied to strengthen Vitebsk, Rudnya, Smolensk, Yartsevo and Dukhovshchina. The enemy lost no less than 11,000–12,000 killed alone, not counting those covered in snow and prisoners, while our army lost 2,872 killed and died from wounds.

During the entire operation, given the severity of the then winter (the temperature dropped below -40 degrees), 201 people suffered from frosts, 423 people went missing.

During the offensive, the army captured large trophies: about 300 guns, about the same number of mortars, about 400 machine guns, over 1200 vehicles, 2 thousand horses, about 1000 motorcycles, about 1000 bicycles, 300 railway cars, about 100 platforms, the richest ammunition depots and food. During the operations, 40 enemy aircraft were shot down. Our losses in both operations were several times less.

At one time, the question of whether it was expedient to take Vitebsk at that moment was discussed. Many said that the capture of Vitebsk was dangerous, because Velikiye Luki hung over us on the right, and on the left - Rudnya, Smolensk and Dukhovshchina. Similar objections were raised by the supporters of trench warfare. These people, devoid of operational audacity, did not know how to develop strategic success. It was necessary to immediately turn the front in two directions, taking advantage of the exceptionally favorable situation that developed in February - March 1942, when the 4th shock army crashed into the territories occupied by the enemy in the form of a wedge. The first direction - Vitebsk - Velikie Luki - Nevel with a simultaneous strike on the Hills, Loknya, Novorzhev. The second direction is Vitebsk - Rudnya - Dukhovshchina - Smolensk. Needless to say, the operations were difficult, but their success could be decisive for further military operations. It is unlikely that the Germans would have held out in Rzhev, Vyazma, Sychevka. It is unlikely that they would have been able to intensify their actions in the direction of Voronezh - Stalingrad - the Caucasus, because then a powerful fist of the Red Army would have been brought in from the north over their rear communications.

The offensive operations of the 4th shock army in difficult terrain and climate conditions made it possible to accumulate valuable experience in organizing an offensive, namely in relation to individual types of weapons, in the field of command and control, headquarters work, operations planning, communications organization, party and political work with troops and local population, work among the enemy troops, logistics and rear work.

Particularly instructive in all respects were the actions of the 249th Rifle Division, which in fact was the striking force of the army, operating in the most critical sectors and successfully fulfilling the tasks that were set for it by the army command.

It is also impossible not to note the actions of the 360th Rifle Division, which has accumulated experience in overcoming inaccessible terrain and fighting in the forests against well-fortified strongholds and pre-prepared defensive lines of the enemy.

A few words should be said about the work of the headquarters. The headquarters of the units and formations that took part in the operations were different in composition and preparedness; the most cohesive and efficient were the headquarters of those formations whose troops already had combat experience. Therefore, in the course of the operation, the issue of directing and monitoring the work of those headquarters that were staffed by officers who had no experience in staff work acquired particular importance.

The headquarters of the 4th shock army was mainly staffed with well-trained and hard-working officers and proved to be a well-coordinated apparatus capable of promptly and correctly solving the tasks put forward by the command, despite the absence of a reserve of staff officers.

Speaking about the work of the headquarters of the 4th shock army, one cannot help but recall the enthusiasm and speed with which the relatively young composition of this headquarters, following the directive of the front and the decisions of the army commander, developed a plan for its first, Toropetsk, offensive operation.

The planning of the operation, with the very hard work of the staff officers, and especially the head of the operational department, Lieutenant Colonel Beilin, was completed within three days.

Time to prepare the operation was very limited. Therefore, simultaneously with the planning of this operation, the officers of the army headquarters met the troops arriving in the army and escorted them to the areas of concentration in the directions of their upcoming offensive. In addition, the officers of the army headquarters held classes with the command staff of the arriving troops and took measures to improve the supply of these troops with everything necessary.

It is impossible not to recall, for example, how Captain Portugalov and Junior Lieutenant Fetishchev, in very difficult off-road conditions, severe frost and blizzards, not only accurately brought out the ski battalions entrusted to them, but also provided them with all kinds of necessary supplies.

Regarding the work of the army headquarters in preparing the operation, it should be noted the very positive work of the communications department of the army headquarters under the leadership of Colonel (then General) K. A. Babkin, who, with the help of his selfless signalers, always and on time provided fairly stable communication through several channels both up and down and with troops.

I would like to cite the memoirs of an ordinary signalman Kirpichnikov, who wrote to me about this period of his service.

“In mid-December, preparations began for some kind of large operation, which we, the signalmen, guessed from the revived activity of the army. Communications units were strenuously laying telegraph lines to the front line. This work, to our surprise, went on during the day, without any disguise from enemy aircraft. As it turned out later, the construction of lines was one of the measures of the command to divert the attention of the enemy from the upcoming operations. Thus, the appearance of preparations for an offensive in the area of ​​​​Lake Seliger was created. The communications department of the army, to which I was seconded, was preparing communication schemes for the area adjacent to Ostashkovo.

At the end of December, in severe frosts, the army headquarters and together with it our regiment began to redeploy in the direction of Ostashkov. The transfer took place in very difficult conditions, along snow-covered forest roads, or even off-road. Part of the route of the regiment's motor vehicle was made along the canvas of the dismantled railway, from which the sleepers were not removed. After the place for the command post was chosen, a very lively work began. Signalers under the leadership of the chief of communications, Colonel K. A. Babkin, intensively prepared documentation (call signs, keys), groups of telephone operators and telegraph operators were formed to organize communication centers at observation posts, command and reserve command posts. Communication with the arriving units was established. There were a lot of troubles, since divisions and brigades that were completely new to us came, sometimes located outside the settlements. Considerable difficulties were presented by the lack of a cable for picking up lines. The battle was literally for every coil. This shortcoming was later replenished by rich trophies.

It was January 9, 1942. After a deceptive silence, early in the morning there was a menacing rumble of artillery preparation. We, the signalers, tried to catch every piece of news from the front line, where the enemy's defenses were being breached. Finally, the telephone operators transmitted: “Ours moved forward, the Fritz ran!” It became joyful. After all, before that, one must frankly admit, it was often very bad at heart, especially when the reports of the Information Bureau were read - in many places our troops retreated into the interior of the country.

Following the units, the army headquarters also moved into the gap. His first command post on the territory liberated from the enemy was located in Veliky Selo, not far from Andreapol. The first prisoners appeared. In those days, they were a novelty for us. German soldiers in light uniforms not adapted for winter had an extremely miserable appearance. Many were frostbitten, wrapped in civilian clothes.

Our troops moved quickly forward. The messengers were having a hard time getting in touch. It must be said that the main burden fell on the wireworms. Thanks to the efforts of the signalmen of our regiment and individual signal companies under the leadership of energetic commanders - Colonel K. A. Babkin, assistants to the chief of communications majors Sachkovsky (who died in 1944) and Tikhonov,

The 56th separate communications regiment of R. F. Malinovsky and other army headquarters in most cases had a stable connection with divisions and brigades. Mainly operated telephone and to a lesser extent - telegraph: "Bodo" ​​and "ST-35".

In early February, the army command post was relocated to Staraya Torop, or rather, to the village of Skagovo, 2-3 kilometers from the railway station. For signalmen, a new hot period began, caused by offensive operations in the direction of Velizh. Stretched communications required a sharp lengthening of communication lines. They were especially lengthened after the capture of Ilyino, Kresty and other points by our troops. This circumstance, as well as the intensified actions of enemy aircraft, greatly complicated the work of signalmen. Due to frequent bombing, cable and permanent lines were interrupted, and often they were violated by our tanks and vehicles moving in a continuous stream from Toropets to the front line. The linemen often had to establish communication under heavy bombing, in deep snow, in the forests. It was especially difficult to establish contact with the group of Major General V. Ya. Kolpakchi, who operated in the direction of Demidov - Dukhovshchina, on the left flank of the army.

The hardening received during the attack on Toropets and Velizh served the personnel of the 56th Separate Signal Regiment in good stead, tempered it. Many signalmen received government awards.

The days of offensive operations of the 4th Shock Army are unforgettable. They showed the strength and perseverance of the Soviet people, who overcame a well-armed enemy and the difficulties of an unusually harsh winter, the ability of military leaders to lead troops forward. Our army fully justified the honorary title of shock army, made a tangible contribution to the defeat of the Nazi hordes.

The offensive began in January 1942. As it developed, the prepared roads ran out, the means of communication lagged behind. Wire communications (cable-pole and permanent lines) did not keep up with the troops and were often destroyed by enemy aircraft, and there was almost no field cable in the army. The radios also lagged behind. Under these conditions, the army headquarters quickly switched to mobile communications (ski relay races, mounted officers from military headquarters to control communication centers), which kept information from the army commander and headquarters.

For the same purpose, and also to help the troops with the start of the offensive, officers of the operations department were sent to all formations of the first echelon, who provided regular information to the army headquarters about the progress of the offensive.

One of the features of troop command and control during an offensive was the issuance of orders and combat orders every evening for troop actions on the night and the next day of battle or to clarify tasks, if this was called for by the situation. These orders were delivered to the troops on time by staff officers. Cases of delay in the delivery of such orders to the troops were extremely rare.

In addition, the officers of the operational department of the army headquarters continuously monitored the progress of the execution of orders by the troops and often, especially in the battles near Toropets and Staraya Toropoy, were in the troops, directly participating in the battles. This method of command and control in those difficult conditions fully justified itself.

With the capture of the city of Toropets, the army headquarters received captured motorcycles with sidecars, which dramatically increased the mobility of its officers. In addition, signalmen mounted radio stations on captured all-terrain vehicles. These all-terrain vehicles subsequently always accompanied the responsible staff officers when they left for the troops.

After the successful completion of the Toropetsk operation, the 4th shock army was transferred from the North-Western to the Kalinin Front and immediately received a new task.

For a sharp turn of the troops to the south and setting them new combat missions, there was only one night. During that night, in accordance with the decision of the army commander, the headquarters developed a new plan of operation, a combat order, private combat orders, prepared maps of new areas of operations and, immediately after approval by the army commander, delivered them to the troops at night.

It is impossible not to recall that some of the compounds, and in particular

The 39th Infantry Brigade of Colonel Poznyak then operated behind enemy lines, and orders could only be delivered to them by plane. And this difficult and dangerous task was successfully carried out by the staff officers. At the same time, the officer of the operational department of the headquarters, Colonel A. Soroko, who was sent to the headquarters of the 39th brigade, who, according to his reports, was in the village of Ponizovye, distinguished himself with courage and resourcefulness. Landing at the outskirts of this village, Colonel Soroko saw that soldiers in helmets were running towards him. He realized that it was the Nazis.

Shooting the fascists running up to the plane from a captured machine gun, the pilot quickly turned the plane around and lifted it into the air. After some searches for the 39th brigade, Colonel Soroko finally found it on the spot and personally handed the army order to the brigade commander Poznyak.

Colonel Soroko and the pilot, who was slightly wounded in the leg, returned to the airfield with several dozen holes in the wings and fuselage of the aircraft.

Before the start of the offensive, the 4th shock army received two separate tank battalions for reinforcement: the 141st (consisting of 4 KB tanks, 7 T-34 tanks, 20 T-60 tanks) and the 117th (consisting of 12 MK-2 tanks , 9 MK-3 tanks, 10 T-60 tanks). There were 62 tanks in total, of which 30 were light.

The tanks arrived in the army with half-used motor resources, while some tankers did not know the new materiel well. The MK-3 tanks were not adapted for driving in deep snow; they had to weld spikes on the tracks of their caterpillars in an artisanal way.

The conditions of the terrain and climate did not allow the widespread use of tanks, the maneuver of the tanks was extremely difficult.

Despite all the difficulties in using tanks, the 141st tank battalion interacted well with the 249th rifle division in the battles for Okhvat, Lugi, Oleksino, Velikoye Selo and Andreapol. Especially well proved, as before, our wonderful tank T-34.

The 171st tank battalion almost did not participate in the battles, since at first it was attached, at the direction of the front headquarters, to the 360th rifle division advancing on the right flank of the army, and then, having received an order to move to the central sector, it was no longer able to catch up with the troops successfully advancing there .

Lieutenant Colonel Malakhov, Deputy Army Commander for Armored Forces, played an important role in commanding the tank forces. He writes about this period of service:

“As part of the 4th shock army, I was appointed deputy commander of the army for armored forces. In this position, I participated in the Toropetsk operation of 1942. The army offensive began on January 9, 1942 and developed successfully, the army troops captured the cities of Peno, Andreapol, Toropets, approached and surrounded the city of Velizh. As part of the 4th shock army, tank troops were represented by the 141st and 171st separate tank battalions. With the approach to the city of Velizh, the 78th tank brigade arrived as part of the army troops. Tankers acted perfectly, despite snowdrifts and forests, as well as swampy areas. Many tankers were awarded government awards, in particular, the commander of the 141st battalion, Captain Kuzhilny, was awarded the Order of Lenin by the Military Council of the Front, and his deputy for the Polovchene combat unit was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for exceptional deeds.

In the battles of January 15, Captain Polovchenya, when the retreating units of the Nazis were forced to move along a narrow road, along the edges of which snowdrifts up to 1–1.5 meters formed, crashed into the retreating columns on the T-34 tank, inflicting huge losses on them. The road was littered with abandoned equipment, hundreds of dead and wounded Nazis. And when one of the Nazis quietly climbed onto the Polovcheni tank and tried to set it on fire with a combustible mixture, he was not at a loss, killed the Nazi, put out the fire and continued to destroy the enemy with caterpillars and weapons.

Combined-arms artillery and reinforcement artillery coped well with their tasks. This was a considerable merit of the army artillery commander, Major General of Artillery Nikolai Mikhailovich Khlebnikov. This is a real combat artillery commander who knew how to think and act in relation to the most difficult situations.

He recalls this period:

“The 27th Army, renamed the 4th Shock Army, advanced in the Andreapol-Toropetsky direction and in two months broke through the deep snow to a depth of 300 km, captured Andreapol, Toropets, Staraya Torop and, surrounding Velizh, advanced to Vitebsk .

The skillful use of ski battalions, supported by mobile mortar and artillery units on ski installations, made it possible to penetrate deep into the enemy’s position and beat him from the rear and flanks. Artillerymen learned to operate in these harsh winter conditions so well that even heavy regiments (152-mm howitzers) kept up with the troops.

With air defense, the situation was more complicated.

All our anti-aircraft artillery consisted of only five divisions of 25-mm and 37-mm guns and two batteries of 76-mm guns. There were no means of communication for the alert network. The VNOS service used command communications. Anti-aircraft artillery often lagged behind the infantry and suffered from a lack of ammunition, however, this need was partially overcome by anti-aircraft gunners through the use of enemy 37-mm shells. It is impossible not to say that out of 29 aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft gunners at that time, 19 accounted for the 615th separate anti-aircraft artillery battalion, commanded by Captain Kalchenko.

It should also be noted that the army air force was included in the 4th shock army, consisting of two regiments of Po-2 night bombers, one SB regiment, and two fighter regiments. In December 1941, Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel Georgy Filippovich Baidukov was appointed head of the Air Force of the 4th shock army.

The Air Force played a positive role in the offensive operation of the army. The army had, as already mentioned, a total of 53 serviceable aircraft. The enemy had air superiority all the time. The lack of forces to equip an airfield near the front line led to the separation of our aviation, already small in number, from the advancing troops. Unfortunately, this did not make it possible to accumulate and generalize any significant experience in the use of aviation in carrying out offensive operations in winter conditions and difficult wooded terrain. However, our pilots did not allow the air enemy into the areas of unloading during the concentration of units, skillfully covered the troops on the march. In preparation for the offensive, our aviation acted on enemy concentrations, on his strongholds both on the front line and in the depths of the defense. During the offensive, aviation was tasked with covering the main grouping of army troops along the axis of movement Ostashkov, Peno, Andreapol, Toropets, Velizh. The cover-up was, however, insufficient, for reasons already known to the reader. By assault actions, the fighters destroyed the retreating enemy, tried to prevent the approach of his reserve. Night raids by our bombers exhausted the enemy in places of concentration and on the defensive.

There were many shortcomings in the manning of air units during combat operations. According to the very strange situation that existed then, the air units were not systematically replenished with either materiel or personnel, but their complete replacement was made when all the aircraft failed. It is not difficult to understand that with such a system, the army often found itself completely without aviation. And then new people arrived, who did not know either the conditions of the combat situation or the conditions of the terrain, so that they were of little use. If we add to this a number of smaller shortcomings, such as the fact that first a new flight crew arrived, and after some time a technical one, then it is not difficult to understand how such a vicious organization reduced the combat effectiveness of the already weak army air forces.

Valuable experience was gained in the use of ski battalions, which proved themselves well in a number of battles, in particular during the capture of Staraya Toropy.

The conduct of both operations, especially Toropetsk, made it possible to further strengthen ski training among the troops.

Much attention during the preparation and conduct of the operation was paid to party political work.

Before characterizing this most important area of ​​troop leadership, I would like to quote a letter sent to me by the former political worker of the army, Efim Kononovich Dzoz.

“I moved to the 4th shock army from the 27th, like many other officers who served in this army. At that time I worked in the political department. The head of the political department at that time was divisional commissar Semyonov, a very demanding and strict political worker, he spoke very briefly, but clearly and understandably. Gathered the entire apparatus of the political department of the army and announced that the 27th army was renamed the 4th shock army, and told us about the upcoming tasks that the army must perform during offensive operations.

The order of the Headquarters to rename our army encouraged all of us, since it was clear that our army was entrusted with large and responsible tasks to defeat the German invaders and that in this direction our army would play the main and decisive role. On the same day, everyone was informed that you were appointed commander of the army.

I remember such a case. When the redeployment of troops took place, many commanders and political workers of the army were sent to the army formations to bring to the attention of the personnel the order of the Headquarters and the tasks that were to be performed. The mood among the personnel was exceptionally high. Everyone was burning with the same desire to quickly launch an offensive and achieve the goal.

Despite the harsh December winter, off-road and lack of transport, people walked, marched in a blizzard and forty-degree frosts in order to defeat the enemy. These high and noble deeds of the soldiers of the 4th shock army did not remain without trace.

The concentration of army troops for the offensive is a complex and difficult task. It was difficult because it was solved in a short time and in severe winter conditions.

By order of the Military Council of the Army on December 29, a group of army staff officers and political workers, including the battalion commissar Konotop and I (I don’t remember the names of the other comrades), arrived at the headquarters of the 249th Infantry Division to assist in bringing the order to the personnel. In total we stayed for three days and on January 1, 1942 we returned to the army headquarters.

The division commander, Colonel Tarasov, listened attentively to the senior group and then spoke about the combat readiness and political and moral state of the division's personnel. He was a highly cultured and sincere man, a smart and disciplined officer. The conversation was interrupted by a phone call. Someone was transmitting intelligence, and he smiled and said in response: “Well, that's good, our assumptions were confirmed,” after which the whole group of officers went to the units. Talking with the fighters and division commanders, we were convinced that the units were seriously preparing to carry out the combat mission, the fighters were in a good mood, there was a high morale and the desire of all personnel to achieve one goal - to start the offensive faster.

The head of the department for work among the enemy troops of the political department of the army was the senior battalion commissar Nemchinov.

Nemchinov, during the period of offensive actions, together with the employees of the department, put a lot of effort and initiative into carrying out this important work. She has not been unsuccessful. It is no coincidence that the Nazis relatively often surrendered for this period of the war, and many of them kept with them the propaganda leaflets that were published by the 7th department.

What E. K. Dzoz told about work among the enemy troops can be supplemented with a few more facts. The skiers and scouts of the 334th Infantry Division alone scattered 350,000 leaflets and newspapers around the enemy positions. This matter was also well put in the 249th division. During the offensive, a powerful radio installation sent by the political department of the front worked in the army, which carried out more than a dozen transmissions for the enemy troops. The program of such broadcasts included speeches by prisoners, an appeal by the Soviet command to German soldiers with an appeal to surrender, etc. Judging by the testimony of prisoners of war, these radio broadcasts were of great interest to enemy soldiers. There were times when they stopped firing, got out of the dugouts and listened to the broadcasts.

Our scouts, scattering leaflets and disguised themselves, more than once observed how German soldiers secretly picked up leaflets from their superiors, read them, and then hid them. The dead and prisoners found our leaflets, hidden in things or documents. The prisoners, however, said that they were afraid to share the contents of the leaflets with anyone, as this threatened to be shot. When our leaflets were found, the Hitlerite command gave orders to make an inscription on them: “enemy propaganda” and immediately hand them over to the officers.

Our scouts, participating in the battles from the beginning of the war until the capture of Staraya Toropa, never met defectors among the prisoners. Confidence in success, created by fascist propaganda, confirmed by easy victories in the West, led in the first months to the fact that we were able to capture prisoners and even documents with great difficulty. The captured prisoners considered themselves doomed, as they were driven into the head that "the Russians shoot all the prisoners," and behaved defiantly and sometimes ridiculously impudently during interrogations. So, one Bavarian prisoner of war, captured on the Western Front, during interrogation stated that they had come to us with the war to “put things in order”. His statement sounded like a paraphrase of the well-known legend about the calling of the Varangians. He said: "Russia is a big country, and you rule it badly." This attack was not the only one.

The very first blows of our army began to bring down the arrogance of these "invincibles". The surrender of an entire company to one platoon is an indicator of fear. A critical revision of the version of the "cruelty" of the Bolsheviks, spread by the Nazis, also began. One of the first defectors who crossed over to us near Staraya Toropa, when asked why he defected and did not retreat with others, replied that it was still unknown whether those who retreated would be able to leave. “Our lieutenant talked about the destruction of prisoners, but I knew that this was a lie. When I was drafted into the army, my father said: “If there is a war, then there is captivity, and the Russians kill only those who resist with weapons,” so I dropped the weapon.”

The corporal of the 189th regiment of the 81st infantry division Herbert Ulyas, when asked how he was captured, said: “When the officer told us that the Russians were coming and that we needed to get out of here as soon as possible, I replied that I would not go any further, let them come Russians, and I will pass to them. I had one more corporal and one chief corporal with me. The officer began to rush us. When the Russians appeared, the officer with a part of the soldiers ran to the right, and the three of us to the left. The officer fired, and the bullet hit my arm, but I still surrendered."

Another corporal from the 83rd division said: “We surrendered because we were morally depressed, hungry, freezing and decided that it was better to work in Russia than to fight in such conditions.”

It must be said that letters from Germany also contributed to the voluntary surrender. So, the father of Herbert Freilich, a soldier of the 105th Infantry Regiment of the 253rd Division, wrote to his son: “Your great-grandfather was in Moscow in 1812, he survived by force. And you, as his great-grandson, follow in his footsteps. By all means try to save yourself and to be captured is better than to be killed.

However, the vast majority of the soldiers, although they expressed hidden dissatisfaction with the war because of the difficult conditions, continued to be drugged by fascist propaganda. In the front-line units, discipline was quite strong, cases of indiscipline were rare. The prestige of the officers remained high.

All our other political agencies also worked smoothly and efficiently.

As soon as the order to go on the offensive was received, political workers quickly brought its content to every fighter and commander. On January 8, on the eve of the offensive, the employees of the political department of the army, after the appropriate briefing, dispersed to the formations. During the operation, they were in critical areas, maintaining a high offensive impulse, assisting the political workers of the units in deploying propaganda work and directing all party political work to the successful implementation of the combat orders of the command. Much attention was paid to the management of daily party work in company party and Komsomol organizations, as well as assistance in establishing the supply of ammunition and food.

Party and Komsomol meetings were held in all units and subunits with the question of the role of communists and Komsomol members in the upcoming offensive.

Special mention should be made of the political department of the 249th Rifle Division, which worked flexibly and purposefully during the entire operation. Being constantly aware of events, the political department solved specific tasks. Its representatives in the units not only controlled the work of political workers, but really ensured the fulfillment of combat missions in a certain area.

The political department of the army paid great attention to organizing the work of the rear. Given the great importance that roads have in this matter, the political agencies of the rear units assisted the command in ensuring the repair and restoration of roads.

Printed propaganda was also well placed in the army, in particular, the work of the army newspaper “The Enemy on the Bayonet”.

The newspaper of the 27th Army "Combat Strike" (later renamed the newspaper "Enemy on the Bayonet") was created in the last days of June 1941 in Riga. From here she began her journey with units of the 27th Army. From the first days of its existence, Nikolai Semenovich Kassin headed the newspaper "Combat Strike". The main core of the editorial staff were students sent from Moscow for retraining courses for army newspaper workers at the Military-Political School. VI Lenin and a group of local Latvian journalists.

In the difficult days of the defensive battles of 1941, the newspaper "Combat Strike" wrote on its pages about the stamina, courage and courage of the soldiers of the Red Army, who defended their Motherland with their breasts. Together with units of the 27th Army, the staff of the newspaper fought through Latvia, the Leningrad and Kalinin regions.

Neither headquarters nor editorial offices at that time were located in settlements. Their place was in the forests. All printing equipment was housed in specially adapted vehicles. And at first, while the supply was not yet organized, the editors carried all the stocks of newsprint and printing ink with them. These stocks were replenished at the expense of the evacuated regional newspapers. At the expense of city and regional newspapers, the staff of the printing house was also completed. The editors took compositors and printers in Ostrov, Lokna, paper - in Kholm, a printing press - in Staraya Russa. It was a formative period.

In the autumn of 1941, when the front line stabilized and our units were accumulating forces for decisive battles, the editorial board “left” the forests and began to settle in settlements.

Only the editor, his deputy, employees of the secretariat were constantly in the editorial office. The rest of the editorial staff was alternately in parts. If one group of editorial workers returned from units, the next day they went to the front lines. The period of stay of correspondents in the editorial office was, as a rule, three to five days. During this time, they managed to write about everything they saw and learned at the forefront. Such a system of work allowed the editorial staff to have daily fresh materials on the combat operations of the units. In addition, the editor had a reserve, which he could promptly send to one or another part.

In addition to the materials organized by the staff of the apparatus, the editors received a large number of letters from soldiers and officers, who helped the newspaper to better cover the combat life of the units. The newspaper published letters from military correspondents in every issue. Military correspondents worked more actively during the defense period.

During the days of the offensive, the newspaper "Enemy on the Bayonet" printed daily operational reports on the advancement of army units, reports on the combat operations of companies, battalions, regiments, on the courage and heroism of soldiers and officers. In order to get from the advancing units to the editorial office, the correspondents used any means of transport: passing cars, fuel trucks, tanks, ambulances. And it was not without reason that poems later became popular among front-line journalists:

Are you alive or dead

The main thing is that in the room

You managed to transfer the material.

And so, by the way,

There was a "wick" for everyone else,

And don't care about the rest.

Sometimes, without having time to write or type a message on a typewriter, a military journalist dictated it directly to a compositor.

War correspondents also went along with the units, in order to later convey on the pages of the newspaper the courage and courage of the soldiers, their hatred for the enemy, selfless devotion to the Motherland. Often they, together with companies or battalions, went into battle, repelling enemy counterattacks with weapons in their hands. And it is no coincidence that Major G. A. Tevosyan (an employee of the editorial office of the newspaper “The Enemy on the Bayonet”) was represented by the command of one of the regiments of the 360th Infantry Division for the government award with the Order of the Red Banner. Majors A. Drozd, A. Goncharuk, I. Yandovsky, captains I. Zaraisky,

R. Akhapkin, Lieutenant Colonel V. Titov, who, after N. S. Kassin left for the front-line newspaper, became the editor of the army newspaper “The Enemy on the Bayonet”, and many others.

Covering offensive battles, the newspaper was not limited to short information about the occupied settlements and trophies. The pages of the newspaper showed the high moral and combat qualities of the soldiers of the Red Army, promoted the combat skills of the best soldiers, officers, units.

The editorial office of the newspaper "Enemy on the Bayonet" had good contact with

7th branch of the political department of the army. Based on the materials of Nemchinov, the newspaper published many interesting materials showing the face of the Nazis. I remember the articles “The Battalion of Criminals in a Square” (about one division of the Nazis, formed from criminals), “Frau and Herrs are moaning” (about letters to the Nazis from the rear of Nazi Germany).

The editorial team lost many comrades during the war years. Among them are writer B. Ivanter, deputy editor I. Kaverin, printer V. Antonov and others.

There were shortcomings in the work of the political agencies, mainly due to the lack of experience of the majority of political workers.

An unusually high offensive impulse, courage, dedication and devotion to the socialist Motherland - that was really a mass phenomenon in the 4th shock army in those days. I would like to recall again the courageous, staunch and disciplined 249th Infantry Division. During the offensive, it became even more tempered, many heroes came out of its ranks. Lieutenant Mishkin is a master of unexpected raids on the enemy, Lieutenant Colonel Nazarenko and Captain Andreev are combat commanders of the vanguard units, battalion commissar Gavrilov, political instructor Cherenkov are real political leaders and leaders.

Here it is necessary to commemorate the kind word of the Chief of Staff

249th Infantry Division, Colonel N. M. Mikhailov, now a retired Major General. A good organizer and closest assistant to the division commander Tarasov, he did a lot to win. Ordinary soldiers and junior commanders also distinguished themselves, such as Sergeant Velikotny, Sergeant Fartfuddinov, who destroyed dozens of Nazis, scouts Devyatkin, Malikov, Prilepin and Polyakov, who destroyed up to 70 enemy soldiers in only one battle. A group of artillerymen showed remarkable resourcefulness. Under heavy machine-gun fire, they crawled up to the 105-mm battery abandoned by the Nazis and, turning their guns, opened fire on the enemy. More than a hundred German shells were fired by brave artillerymen, destroying six machine-gun emplacements and 10 enemy vehicles.

Even when a difficult situation was created, the warriors did not lose their composure, fought bravely and inflicted heavy damage on the enemy. In one of the battles, more than a company of the Nazis, with the support of machine-gun and mortar fire, attacked the battery of Lieutenant Dedov in the flank. The battery commander turned his guns and met the enemy with volleys. As a result, up to 50 enemy soldiers and two mortars were destroyed. The Nazis fled without looking back. The soldiers of the 332nd Rifle Division fought bravely, the personnel of the 358th, 360th Rifle Divisions and other army formations acted well.

The troops of the 4th shock army liberated several hundred settlements from the Nazi invaders. Residents of towns and villages welcomed the return of their native Red Army with joy.

We helped local organizations to restore Soviet and party organs, to improve the economy, to put things in order. Local residents provided material assistance to army units. So, in s. The collective farmers fugitively provided a whole battalion with food for two days. In the village of Kolpino, Zaborovsky village council, the population gave us (the 360th Infantry Division) 20 pounds of rye, 86 pounds of potatoes, fodder and 13 horses for its delivery. In the village of Grishino, the collective farmers decided to repair the bridges and clear the roads in order to ensure the fastest possible advance of the troops.

The deputy head of the army intelligence department, and then the head of the department, lieutenant colonel Alexander Mitrofanovich Bykov, now a retired colonel, shared with me his notes of that time:

“Great frosts (23.12–28 °, 26.12–32 °) brought great hardships to our units and units, frostbite appeared, and to help the headquarters of the formations in organizing temporary housing and recreation for the troops, almost the entire headquarters and political department of the army was thrown into parts. In particular, I was sent to Mishchenko in the 334th Infantry Division. We organized the construction of huts, insulated them with spruce branches. Soldiers were taught how to make smokeless bonfires "nody". The soldiers, having removed the snow to the ground inside the hut, used it to line the walls outside, while inside they made a fire from two logs 1.5–2 meters long, laying them one on top of the other with a gap of 3–5 cm, kindling a fire in this gap. These logs, smoldering, almost did not give off smoke, turned into coals, and there was a tolerable plus temperature in the hut.

At the same time, reconnaissance platoons of rifle regiments and reconnaissance officers of the division headquarters were instructed. Major Chuikov, a brave, energetic comrade, was here as a reconnaissance officer for the division headquarters. Subsequently, he was appointed deputy chief of the intelligence department of the army. Chuikov was well versed in the situation and, acting through the lake. Volgo, with his scouts, quickly and basically correctly determined the outline of the front line of the enemy's defense and the location of his firing points, which then contributed to the successful operation of the division.

I also remember such a very characteristic episode, testifying to the high fighting spirit of our soldiers and officers, their determination to fulfill any combat mission. Through the lake Seliger from s. Zhar was to be crossed over the ice by the 360th division, the 48th rifle brigade and tanks. The ice was not strong enough to allow tanks to pass, and it was decided to increase it. The 66th ski battalion was concentrated on January 10 in order to cover these works and further joint operations in the Zaborya area. To check its readiness and security, I was sent by the army commander to this battalion.

My all-terrain vehicle did not pass. I went on foot, then I got a horse, on it I did 24 km back and forth. I was driving on roads under the control of the enemy. A little scary, but, in general, nothing. Found a battalion in Zaborye. People are hungry, but the mood is fighting. By noon, the battalion went to its area, where it was supposed to receive food. Cars with food got stuck in the snow on the ice of the lake, and by the time of the performance, the battalion had not received food.

Acting in the name of the army commander (confirming the importance of measures with an all-terrain vehicle, which by that time was familiar not only to commanders of formations and units, but also to many privates), I got a cargo sleigh with horses for food from the commander of a sapper battalion, having organized an overload, I myself left with two soldiers forward to the battalion. Having passed through the island and reached the western shore of the lake, we cautiously moved along the path, which, obviously, had been laid by German patrols. I found the battalion of skiers concentrated at a small forest gatehouse east of Zaborye. Here the battalion commander, a very young captain Andreev, announced the task to the company commanders and gave a combat order to march. Not a word was said about the fact that the soldiers, and even the commanders, were hungry and there was no food, there was no talk about food in the units either. Both commanders and soldiers listened to the order with full attention and determination to carry it out. Untimely delivery of products, according to the battalion commander, is obviously caused by some unforeseen circumstances. “I am sure,” said the battalion commander, “that the products will soon catch up with us.”

The battalion did an excellent job of its task, but the battalion commander died a glorious death while trying to intercept the Surazh-Vitebsky-Vitebsk road. Further, from the notes of Colonel A. M. Bykov, you can restore the picture of the work of the army intelligence.

Ski battalions played an important role in reconnaissance throughout the offensive operations. Making extensive use of their maneuverability, small detachments of skiers entered the enemy’s rear through the forests, captured prisoners and documents, which gave the command and army headquarters the opportunity to guess the enemy’s plans in a timely manner, especially his attempts to throw up reserves or escape from under attack to a new line.

All the troops of the army very quickly instilled a desire to help scouts study the enemy. The intelligence department of the army received a lot of different documents - soldier's books, letters, diaries, orders. There were cases of delivery of cigarette labels and recipes, and the heads of intelligence regiments and divisional headquarters quickly figured out the need to systematize the selected documents, correctly indicated the points of their production. The study of these documents was very helpful in revealing individual attempts by prisoners, especially officers, to mislead and misinform us.

Using the documents, comparing the data obtained from the documents with the testimonies of the prisoners, the intelligence department of the army was able to correctly assess the enemy and took advantage of this opportunity.

The head of the 3rd information department was Major Kondakov, a very thoughtful, serious intelligence officer who had an exceptional memory and a very good rule - to write down in a special book, by the way, established by him, the symbols of enemy units and formations - “oak leaf”, “bear ”, “Mountain flower”, special, characteristic features in the actions of these units, their numbers, weapons, losses and replenishments, etc. This helped in assessing the enemy already in the process of the first offensive of the army and was of exceptionally great importance for studying and evaluating enemy in the future. Working in close contact with the interpreter Captain Markov, Major Kondakov, in a tense situation, was able to inform the division headquarters as soon as possible about new information about the enemy, continuously kept the departments of the headquarters and the headquarters of the military branches abreast of events in the offensive zone of the army.

A significant role in reconnaissance of the enemy was played by the 2nd branch of the reconnaissance department - the head of Major Glazkov, assistant captain Evstafiev. Through the scouts of this department, the reconnaissance department in a timely manner, even before the capture of Andreapol, received detailed information about the garrison of the city and the warehouses that were concentrated there.

A good memory was left by the political officer of the intelligence department, Lieutenant Colonel A. N. Guselnikov, who was mortally wounded near Velizh by a shell fragment (in December 1942). It seems that there was not a single reconnaissance platoon where the political officer did not visit, explaining the goals and tasks of intelligence. Being himself an experienced scout, he skillfully directed the actions of reconnaissance units.

We also had something that slowed down the work of intelligence, such as the almost complete absence of translators not only in rifle regiments, but also in division headquarters. This often prevented the command of regiments and divisions from using fresh information about the enemy immediately after the capture of prisoners or documents, and sometimes home-grown translators incorrectly translated the testimonies of prisoners, which created confusion.

In the rear of the fascist German troops operating in front of the army front, there were several partisan detachments. Up to a hundred people joined the Penovsky detachment during the month of its combat activity. On the combat account of this detachment there were many destroyed enemy vehicles, blown up bridges, killed soldiers and officers of the enemy. Serezhinsky partisan detachment raided the Nazi garrison in the village of Manor and destroyed 40 enemy vehicles there.

The headquarters and the political department of the army kept close contact with the partisan detachments, assigned them combat missions, and directed their political work among the population. Specially trained comrades were sent to the partisan detachments. By disrupting enemy communications, the partisans also did a lot of work among the population.

The activity of the partisans intensified especially when our offensive unfolded. The partisans came out of the forests to provide direct assistance to the Soviet units. They guarded the villages from the enemy, who sought to burn everything during his retreat.

Huge work was done during the operation by the rear of the army. There is no need to say much about the complexity of their activities. It can be said directly that the material support of the army, especially food, and partly fuel and even ammunition, was carried out at the expense of the enemy.

On February 13, when the army troops successfully completed the Toropetsk and Velizh operations, I surrendered the army to Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov and went to the hospital.

Many participants in the Taropetsk and Velizh operations were deservedly awarded. The majority of company and battalion commanders, all regimental and divisional commanders received awards. The commander of the 249th division, who especially distinguished himself in battles, received two orders. The awards were received by the commanders of the military branches, the chief of staff of the army Kurasov, a member of the Military Council Rudakov.

Many years have passed since then, but I am still proud that I had the honor of commanding the 4th shock army, which successfully participated in the Toropetsk and Velizh operations and completed the tasks assigned to it in incredibly difficult conditions.

I was placed in a hospital, which was located in the building of the Agricultural Academy. Timiryazev, the very one where I was treated after being wounded on the Bryansk Front.

The care here was still wonderful. Doctors and other medical workers showed great care and attention to me.

During my stay in the hospital, I was visited by many military, party and Soviet figures, with whom I happened to work together or have close contact in the service, in party and Soviet work. So, comrades P. K. Ponomarenko, K. V. Kiselev and others visited me from Belarus; A. Yu. Snechkus, M. A. Gedvilas, Yu. I. Paleckis, and others from Lithuania; from the military were comrades A. V. Khrulev, F. N. Fedorenko and many others.

I received a lot of notes and letters: they were of different content, but one thing they had in common was to achieve victory over the enemy as soon as possible. Many letters expressed a desire to take a personal part in bringing victory closer.

The hospital was often visited by teams of Moscow artists who performed in the club, and for bedridden patients - right in the wards, there were workers from Moscow factories and collective farmers from villages near Moscow. Completely unfamiliar people came to the ward, but the conversation started, and after 5-10 minutes it seemed that you were talking with a person close to you. Thoughts were all the same - to defeat the enemy.

In all this, the concern of our Party for people temporarily out of action was visible.

Service in the 4th shock army ended the first period of my activity during the war years, connected with the Western direction. After my recovery, I was appointed commander of a front operating between the Don and Volga rivers.

Remembering the battles of the Great Patriotic War, most often they mean the well-known titanic battles. Meanwhile, Stalingrad, Kursk, the siege of Leningrad are just the tip of the iceberg. It is unrealistic to cover even all the major battles of this hellish confrontation. In addition to strategic operations - truly massive battles, from which the planet was shaking, the Great Patriotic War includes more than a thousand major battles. There is hardly an amateur who can even list them, and yet these were clashes with tens of thousands of participants, and more people died in places than in any medium-sized war. Often such battles ended in nothing, although sometimes they had serious consequences.

One example of such an unfamous battle is the battle in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe city called Gorodok in eastern Belarus. Speaking about the liberation of this republic, they almost always mean Operation Bagration in the summer of 1944. However, its foundation was laid much earlier.

German tanks in eastern Belarus

The intrigue began in October 1943, when the neighboring armies of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts successfully broke through the front in the Nevel area, and advanced westward at a good pace. The problem was that the troops failed to complete what they started. It was not possible to expand the neck of the breakthrough, and as a result, the 3rd and 4th shock armies of the Russians were drawn into a large bag. The neck of the bag was, in fact, Nevel, through which supplies for tens of thousands of people with thousands of pieces of equipment went. Vitebsk remained to the south, in the rear to the northeast - Velikie Luki.

The corridor, only 10 kilometers wide, was shot through with artillery. In addition, in this entire strip there was only one single road surrounded by swamps. Those who sat in the sack felt the need for everything, including provisions. It was necessary to deliver the necessary, overcoming not only German fire, but also mud. In 1942, such situations - a breakthrough and a bag with a narrow neck - arose regularly, and usually ended in a boiler and death (the most famous such case was the defeat of Vlasov's 2nd shock army in Myasnoy Bor). The Germans perfectly saw the opportunity to arrange a large encirclement in one fell swoop, and prepared for it, happily rubbing their paws. But it was no longer the forty-second year in the yard - times have changed.

The created situation contained mutual opportunities. The 4th and 3rd shock armies were in a semi-encirclement, but because of this, the Germans were also sitting in exactly the same bag south of Nevel. In the southern part of this ledge was, in fact, Gorodok. It turned out to be a kind of "operational yin-yang": the Germans went into the rear of the Russians and vice versa. The question was who would have time to carry out a successful offensive and close the throat of the enemy first. The situation required a very accurate calculation of the moment. Those who hurried were expecting the failure of the offensive, after which the enemy could deliver his blow to the exhausted would-be hurryers. Delay, again, meant a "cauldron" as a result of a successful foreign offensive. However, on the Soviet side, with the calculation of the moment, they guessed exactly.

Mutual "bags" and the general plan of the battle

The operation was carried out by the 1st Baltic Front, commanded by Ivan Bagramyan. During the war, this commander rose from a colonel to an army general. In 1941, Bagramyan broke through from the Kiev pocket. In the summer of 1943, the army under his command successfully operated near Orel, and in November Bagramyan received command of the front. The town was his first operation in this position.

The plan of attack was simple and logical. From the east, outside the bag, the 11th Guards Army was to attack: 4 rifle and one tank corps. The 1st TC at that time was only recovering after heavy fighting, it included 97 combat vehicles, of which only 62 were combat-ready. Another 63 tanks and self-propelled guns were in a separate brigade and a heavy tank regiment. From the inside, the 4th shock army could only attack with two rifle corps (the rest of the forces defended the perimeter of the bag). But her armored fist was not bad by the standards of time and place: 125 tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as a cavalry corps.

November was outside. In the swamps in the rain it was impossible even to dig dugouts, they were immediately flooded. The roads were wrecked, trucks made their way through the narrow bag only thanks to incredible efforts, ammunition and spare parts accumulated slowly. Everyone was nervous, the operation was postponed, and most importantly, no one could know what was happening on the enemy side of the front.

For Baghramyan, this operation was the first as a commander of such a rank, and Ivan Khristoforovich, of course, was very worried about the fate of his debut. For the commanders of both advancing armies, Generals Chibisov and Galitsky, these were also new positions, and Chibisov, who led the 4th shock army, which was beating from the inside of the bag, also had to be rehabilitated: the previous appointment ended for him with removal from leadership of the troops.

On the left is General of the Army Ivan Bagramyan (1897-1982)

In the 11th Guards Army, it got to the point that shells were dragged to the front line on foot: thousands of people daily dragged ammunition to the front on their hump. Inside the bag, the situation, of course, was even worse: by the beginning of the battle, the artillery had only 0.6 ammunition. In practice, this meant that the artillery preparation and fire escort of the attackers would leave much to be desired. The problem was partly solved by thorough reconnaissance carried out before the offensive. In addition, the Russians were counting on tanks. The widespread use of armored vehicles could partly compensate for the shortage of heavy artillery.

Fortunately, the Germans, represented by General Reinhardt's 3rd Panzer Army, were also far from in the best position. For the first counterattacks on Nevel, they were able to scrape together only one infantry and one tank division, and this blow got stuck in the defensive formations of the Red Army. The desynchronization of enemy actions helped the Russians: the advancing units of the Wehrmacht did not support from the other side of the neck. In addition, the Russians managed to improve the swampy terrain by covering the approaches to their positions with extensive minefields. The offensive of the German troops quickly stalled after minor tactical successes.

However, everyone was well aware that the first attempt could be followed by a new one, to which the Germans would methodically assemble a strong group. Fortunately, Reinhardt had the Vitebsk-Nevel railway for this, running straight along the entire German bag, and a breakthrough even to a shallow depth could be fatal for Soviet troops in this area. Fortunately, on December 6, a moderate frost hit, and the muddy roads became passable, which caused great relief among the Soviet commanders. The preparations ended at an accelerated pace, and exactly a week later the offensive began.

Due to bad weather, aviation could not take off, and artillery, due to a lack of ammunition, also failed to suppress German colleagues. The main burden of the battle was to be borne by the infantry and tank troops. Therefore, at first the offensive developed slowly. Only one division of General Peters was able to seriously displace the front with a blow from the east.

Peters himself was a remarkable personality: the tsarist officer from the nobility (!), Who served in the Civil War with Trotsky (!!), made a good career in the Red Army. True, his father was also a staunch Marxist, and participated in the revolution of 1905, for which he was sent to royal exile. However, in the USSR of the 1930s, even a person with an impeccable biography for a red commander could not have survived before the war. Be that as it may, now his division was confidently making its way with tanks and gunfire, striking directly from the infantry formations. She broke through the first line of defense, and it was already a success.

Major General Georgy Peters (1897-1978) and his hopelessly aristocratic physiognomy

And not the last success. From inside the bag attacked the rifle corps of General Beloborodov, reinforced by a tank brigade. The Russians advanced through the inter-lake defile south of Bychikha station. During the first day, the corps traveled 5 kilometers. Not very impressive on the map, but in reality it meant that the German front was broken. The success of Beloborodov was brought by a neat organization of the interaction of arms. The threat of the loss of the railway loomed over the enemy. Counterattacks could slow down, but not stop the breakthrough. The German front began to lose stability.

The offensive proceeded under wet snow among the swamps. The sky was covered with gloomy clouds, the troops on the front line were deprived of the most basic comforts, but they still made their way forward, despite extremely poor conditions. In addition, intelligence did not reveal a significant part of the German firing points, and now the sappers had to work not only up to their necks in the swamp, but also under fire. The tanks were the main trump card of the attackers, but without the efforts of the sapper units they could not attack, which led to heavy losses of "engineers". According to the historian of the 1st Tank Corps, Pyotr Kirichenko, sappers generally accounted for half of all the losses of the corps in the early days.

Two breakthroughs were planned: from the northeast to the southwest, the 11th Guards pressed. Galitsky's army with Peters' division in the forefront, and parts of the 4th shock Chibisov went from the southwest to the northeast - more precisely, in fact, one Beloborodov's corps. The next day the Russians continued to force their way through. Peters' division was now advancing along with all the forces of the 1st Panzer Corps. With the help of an armored ram, she soon intercepted the Vitebsk-Nevel highway in the rear of the Germans. Enemy communications in the area of ​​the ledge began to collapse.

Self-propelled gunners of the Red Army in the Nevel area

The bag also drew the correct conclusions from the events of the first day of the battle. On the evening of December 13, mobile formations entered their original positions: 41 tank brigades and cavalrymen. The next morning they went into the breach. The bet on the cavalry turned out to be correct: it was the horsemen who pushed through the German positions and on the evening of December 14 they reached the Nevel-Gorodok railway. On December 15, the breakthrough had already reached four kilometers in width, and the arrows turned to the front to the south, insuring the broken corridor from possible saviors of the encircled German group. The main supply routes for several German divisions were cut off, and most importantly, all the reserves had already been committed to battle, and there was nothing to counter the persistent attacks of the two armies. By noon on December 16, the ring was completely closed.

Five infantry divisions fell into the cauldron. In contrast to the encirclement of the beginning of the war, when parts of the Wehrmacht could wait for saving counterattacks from the outside, in the realities of the end of 1943, delaying a breakthrough most often meant defeat and death. Therefore, the Gorodok cauldron lasted barely a day. Already on December 17, the encircled units made a breakthrough.

Germans in the trenches near Nevel

While the encirclement was loose, the German units managed to break through to freedom. However, such a breakthrough, of course, cost the Wehrmacht serious losses. In particular, the 87th Infantry Division lost one and a half thousand people dead during this breakthrough, all equipment, vehicles, as well as any weapons heavier than a rifle.

The Russians were going to build on their success. The nearest goal was, in fact, Gorodok. The Soviet troops did not cut off the entire ledge, but only its top, but now the base also shook. For a breakthrough to Gorodok, Bagramyan chose the 11th Guards. army, which he himself commanded near Kursk. After a short respite, she turned due south and moved towards the city. The resistance, however, was far less sluggish than might have been expected. In this area was the battered 20th Panzer Division, the 14th Motorized Division, several more divisions arrived from the reserve, as well as the Tiger battalion. In addition, after the encirclement battles, the anti-tank division of the RGK on heavy Nashorn self-propelled guns retreated to the south. It was an extremely serious argument. The basis of the Russian tank fleet was already obsolete T-34-76, only partially capable of fighting heavy armored vehicles. Nevertheless, the reserves went into battle "from the wheels", the Soviet troops used the seized initiative with might and main. The front of the 14th motorized infantry division collapsed under the impact of a mass of armor and artillery shells. After this breakthrough was sealed by reserves, a gap in the German positions appeared in another sector. The counterattack of the fresh motorized infantry division "Feldherrnhalle" failed. The Russians were no longer breaking through to Gorodok, but were aiming further south, at Vitebsk, the ultimate goal of all efforts in this sector.

Abandoned "Tiger" of the famous 501 heavy tank battalion

However, the German generals, who at first did not respond very well to the threat of encirclement of the salient, now vigorously fought the consequences of their first failure. Throwing in reserves, moreover, equipped with powerful anti-tank weapons and heavy tanks, quickly led to the thinning of the steel avalanche of Soviet troops. The pace of advance dropped sharply. Nevertheless, the inertia of the blow was enough to break into Gorodok with a night attack from three sides and clean it up. However, the offensive lost momentum, and the mass of German tanks thrown to plug the breakthrough made further offensive attempts futile. After the capture of Gorodok, the 1st Panzer Corps withdrew to the rear due to heavy losses.

At the end of the year, the Russians managed to advance some more distance. The tanks even broke through close to the command post of the commander of the German 3rd Panzer Army, Reinhardt, but these were rapidly fading oscillations. True, the 4th shock army managed to intercept the highway and the railway leading to Vitebsk from the west, but this could only be regarded as a consolation prize. On December 31, the Gorodok operation ended.

Soldiers of the Red Army in the liberated Nevel

Under the cover of a battle north of Vitebsk, the Soviet 39th Army achieved a small but important success. She was on the periphery of the battle, south of Vitebsk, but her actions created a serious reserve for future offensives. At the end of December, the army advanced in a short throw towards the Luchesa River and entered positions south of Vitebsk. Thus, Vitebsk was now in a semi-encirclement, which represented a serious reserve for the future "Bagration" - one of the most brilliant operations of the Red Army in the entire war.

The battle for Gorodok cost the Wehrmacht heavy losses. The 2nd airfield division was disbanded following the results of the battle, and the two most affected divisions had to be withdrawn to the rear for replenishment. According to Soviet claims, 3,300 Germans were taken prisoner, and between 20,000 and 65,000 died. The last figure looks very high, but there is no doubt that the Wehrmacht received a serious slap in the face. German ten-day reports report more than 800 dead for December 11-20 and about 2,500 killed and missing from the 21st to 31st in the entire 3rd Panzer Army. These data can be safely considered underestimated: as could be seen, only during the breakthrough on the 17th, one of the encircled infantry divisions immediately lost almost 1,500 people killed and missing. By the end of the battle, the strength of some German divisions was practically exhausted. For example, in the 6th airfield division, the combat strength (i.e., the number of soldiers directly involved in the battle) by the end of the battle was only 436 people, that is, the formation was actually defeated.

Gorodok also cost the Soviet side heavy losses. From October to December, 43 thousand people died on the 1st Baltic Front, but it is not possible to isolate the victims of the attack on Gorodok, because since October the front has carried out a whole cascade of operations, including an attack on Nevel.

German artillery positions near Vitebsk, late 1943. Their time will come later.

The Russians now hung menacingly over Vitebsk, and Nevel became not the center of a narrow corridor, but a reliable rear position. Since the threat of encirclement hung over the German forces north of Nevel, the Wehrmacht independently cleared the ledge: about 40 km of the Red Army passed without fighting at all.

The battle for Gorodok did not receive the same wide popularity as, for example, the successful attack on Vitebsk in the summer of 1944. However, the value of this operation is quite large. The Soviet troops not only managed to avoid encirclement, but arranged a local "cauldron" for the enemy, freeing a noticeable part of Belarus. In 1941 or 1942, an offensive under such conditions, on impassable roads and with a “bottleneck” in the rear, almost always ended in defeat. This time, however, more thorough preparation, perfect command and presence of strong armored forces brought success. Although all the moves in this game were obvious, the Russians managed to form a powerful grouping to attack faster than the enemy, preempt the Germans and in the end inflicted a painful defeat on them. Although the main prize of the campaign, Vitebsk, was never won, the Russians not only won the battle, but also created an excellent reserve for the future. In the coming months, a series of unsuccessful offensives unfolded in Belarus, but the success of the Gorodok operation was truly used in the summer of 1944 during the grandiose Operation Bagration.

Home Encyclopedia History of wars Liberation of Belarus Details

I. Offensive of the Kalinin (1st Baltic) Front in the Nevelsk, Gorodok and Vitebsk directions

In July 1943, having repelled enemy attacks in the area of ​​the Kursk salient, the Soviet Armed Forces launched large-scale offensive operations. In accordance with the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the main blow in the summer-autumn campaign was dealt in the south-western direction in order to liberate the Donbass and the richest agricultural regions of the Left-Bank Ukraine, access to the Dnieper and capture bridgeheads on its right bank. At the same time, an offensive began in the western direction. Thus, the prerequisites were created for the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Belarus and the advance of the Red Army to the borders of East Prussia and Poland.

Assessing the future prospects for armed struggle, the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, not without reason, believed that a strike by Soviet fronts in the western direction could lead to serious consequences. In this regard, the Department of Foreign Armies of the East, considering the situation in the zone of the Army Group Center, emphasized in its conclusions that after the capture of Smolensk, "new operational opportunities will open up before the command of the Red Army ...". Using them, the Soviet troops will strive to "break through as far as possible to the west and provide ... advantageous starting areas for subsequent operations against the Minsk region ...".

Therefore, even before the end of the summer of 1943, the enemy began to prepare numerous echeloned defensive lines and lines. On August 11, A. Hitler ordered the immediate construction of a defensive line of strategic importance, the so-called Eastern Wall, which was supposed to run from the Kerch Peninsula along the Molochnaya, Dnieper and Sozh rivers to Gomel, further east of Orsha, Vitebsk, Nevel, Pskov and north of Lake Peipsi along the river Narva. In pursuance of the Fuhrer's instructions, the German troops launched intensive work to create long-term and field fortifications, focusing on road junctions and river banks, settlements and tank-hazardous areas.

In this situation, the Kalinin, Western and Bryansk fronts, having launched the Smolensk (August 7 - October 2) and Bryansk (August 17 - October 3) offensive operations in August, overcame the stubborn resistance of Army Group Center by the beginning of the third decade of September and went north -eastern and eastern borders of Belarus. At the same time, the armies of the Central Front created favorable conditions for the liberation of the southeastern regions of the republic. The results achieved in the western direction, as well as intelligence reports that the enemy suffered heavy losses here, was demoralized and had no reserves, prompted the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to decide to continue the offensive to a greater depth in order to capture Riga, Vilna (Vilnius. - Approx. ed.) and Minsk. But first it was supposed to defeat the groupings of German troops in Eastern Belarus. To do this, the troops of the Kalinin Front had to strike in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction in order to cover Army Group Center from the north. From the south, advancing to Gomel and Bobruisk, it was to be captured by the Central Front. The Western Front received the task of operating in the Orsha and Mogilev directions.

It should be said that the Headquarters did not have sufficient grounds for optimistic forecasts and setting such decisive tasks for the fronts. They did not have much superiority over the enemy: in terms of people only 1.1 times, tanks - 2 times, guns and mortars - 1.8 times. Only on aircraft it was tangible - 3.7 times. In addition, during the previous long offensive, formations and units suffered heavy losses, lacked people, equipment, ammunition, fuel, food and other materiel. The situation was aggravated by the wooded and swampy terrain, which made it difficult to maneuver and supply the troops, and the coming autumn thaw. All this had a negative impact on the subsequent hostilities of the Kalinin (1st Baltic), Western and Central (Belarusian) fronts.

Back in August 1943, long before the completion of the Smolensk offensive operation, the commander of the troops of the Kalinin Front, General of the Army A.I. Eremenko received from the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command the task of developing a preliminary plan for an offensive in the Vitebsk-Polotsk direction. At the same time, it was planned to strike another blow on the right wing of the front with the aim of capturing the city of Nevel. Such actions made it possible to cut enemy communications on the adjacent wings of the North and Center Army Groups, disrupt the interaction between them and thereby isolate the German troops in Belarus from the receipt of reserves.

However, the difficult situation prevailing at that time in the western direction did not allow the implementation of these plans in the shortest possible time. The command of the Kalinin Front was able to return to them only at the end of September, when they began preparing the Nevelsk offensive operation (it was carried out with the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Belarus. - Approx. Aut.). In accordance with the plan of Army General A.I. Eremenko, the main role in it was assigned to the 3rd shock army of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. She was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Nevel, capture the city, and then gain a foothold to the north and west of it in the inter-lake defile zone. Another blow, in the direction of Gorodok, was inflicted by the 4th shock army of Major General V.I. Shvetsov.

By October 1943, the 3rd Shock Army was operating in a 105 km wide zone. She was opposed by five divisions of the German 2nd airfield and 43rd army corps. Being on the defensive for six months, they created several echeloned defensive lines and lines, equipped with trenches, full profile communication passages, dugouts and wood-and-earth gun emplacements. The forward edge was covered by two lanes of minefields 40-60 m deep each, as well as two rows of barbed wire. The total depth of the first strip reached 6-7 km.

The wooded-marshy, rugged terrain with an abundance of natural barriers also contributed to the creation of a stable defense with relatively small forces. Nevel itself was bordered on all sides by numerous lakes, separated by several defiles no more than 2 km wide. Between the lakes, the enemy dug anti-tank ditches, and on the roads he set mines and reinforced concrete gouges in 5-8 rows. He turned the settlements on the outskirts of the city into centers of resistance. The Nevel garrison consisted of the 343rd security battalion, the construction battalion of the 43rd army corps, rear units and institutions - more than 2 thousand people in total.

The 3rd shock army united five rifle divisions, three rifle brigades, one tank brigade, seven cannon, howitzer and mortar regiments, an anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery regiment and two field fortified areas. The number of rifle divisions averaged 5-6 thousand, rifle brigades - 3-4 thousand people. It was not realistic to conduct an offensive with such limited forces in the entire strip. Therefore, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to break through the enemy defenses in a narrow area, the width of which was only 4 km. In a short time, in compliance with camouflage measures, in fact, all combat-ready formations, as well as all tanks (54 units) and almost all artillery of the army (814 guns and mortars out of 886) were concentrated to it. In the rest of the zone, two field fortified areas, an army reserve regiment, four barrage detachments and two poorly manned rifle divisions took up the defense.

The operational formation of the army included: the first echelon (28th and 357th rifle divisions); success development echelon (78th tank brigade, 21st guards rifle division, one of the regiments of which was supposed to operate on vehicles, three artillery regiments); reserve (46th Guards Rifle Division, 31st and 100th Rifle Brigades). Such a separation of forces and means was due to the conduct of hostilities in a wooded and swampy area, when maneuver along the line of contact between the parties was extremely difficult, and the need, in connection with this, to continuously increase the force of strike from the depths.

The transition of the main forces to the offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force, which began at 5 o'clock in the morning on October 6. For its implementation, one rifle company, supported by artillery, was allocated from each of the two divisions of the first echelon. And although the advanced units were unable to capture individual sections of the first trench, their actions made it possible to clarify the enemy's firing points, identify several mortar and artillery batteries, as well as observation posts. At 08:40, the artillery preparation of the attack began, which lasted 1 hour and 35 minutes and ended with a volley of two regiments of rocket artillery. After that, several groups of 6-8 aircraft of the 211th assault aviation division, Colonel P.M. Kuchma struck at the strongholds of German units at the forefront and in tactical depth.

After artillery and aviation strikes, the 357th and 28th rifle divisions of Major General A.L. Kronik and Colonel M.F. Bukshtynovych went on the attack. Within two hours, units of the 28th Rifle Division penetrated the enemy defenses in a 2.5 km wide area and advanced up to 2 km. But the 357th division did not achieve success: its advanced units were stopped in front of wire obstacles by heavy fire from tactical reserves transferred by the enemy command. In order to prevent the strengthening of the grouping of German troops in the direction of the emerging success and the slowdown in the offensive, the army commander decided to enter the echelon of success development into the battle. At 12 o'clock, the battalions of the 78th Tank Brigade (Colonel Ya.G. Kochergin) with a landing of machine gunners began to be drawn into the narrow neck in two columns, and behind them - the regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division, whose units moved by car. In each column, in addition to tanks and vehicles, artillery and mortar batteries, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, as well as sappers followed.

At first, the pace of the group's advance was slow due to the presence of wetlands and minefields. In the current situation, a responsible task was assigned to sappers. Under artillery and machine-gun fire, they reconnoitered and cleared the road, moving ahead of the tanks. The battalions of the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel N.P. Chebotarev.

The close interaction of tankers with sappers, rifle units and artillery, their decisive joint actions ensured success. By 2 p.m. on October 6, the mobile group overcame the defenses of the German troops and rushed to Nevel at top speed, destroying the retreating carts, artillery and pushing back the surviving small enemy groups to the north and south. Tankers went to the river. Shestikha, forestalled the 2nd airfield division, which was retreating to it, in occupying an advantageous defensive line, crossed over serviceable bridges across the river and captured artillery pieces abandoned by the enemy in firing positions.

Already at 4 p.m., tank battalions with a landing of submachine gunners, having defeated the German units on the outskirts of Nevel, entered the city, captured the telegraph, railway station and bridges. They were followed by advanced units of the 59th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division. By the end of October 6, Nevel was cleared of the enemy. Soviet troops destroyed up to 600 of his soldiers and officers, captured about 400 prisoners.

In fact, the 3rd shock army achieved the goal of the operation within one day, moving forward more than 35 km, which, in the conditions of a well-prepared defense in terms of engineering and a wooded and swampy area, was a great success. Not giving the enemy the opportunity to restore the position and control of the troops, the army commander brought the 31st rifle brigade into battle. Destroying the retreating groups of the enemy, by the morning of October 7, she expanded the breakthrough to 10-12 km. By the end of the day, the brigade took possession of the Pechishche line, Lake. Yemenets (south of Nevel). To the north of the city, the 46th Guards Rifle Division, Major General S.I., entered into battle on the morning of October 8, entrenched. Karapetyan.

In an effort to prevent further advance of the 3rd shock army in the north-western direction, the German command began to hastily transfer reserves from other sectors to the threatened direction - the 58th and 122nd infantry divisions from the Volkhov and Staraya Rusa regions, the 281st security division from near Novorzhev. At the same time, large aviation forces were aimed here, which, operating in groups of 20-40 aircraft, began to strike at the battle formations of the Soviet troops.

On the morning of October 8, the enemy brought into battle newly arrived units with a total strength of at least two divisions. He struck the strongest blow west of Nevel at the positions of the 69th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 21st Guards Rifle Division. Here, up to an infantry regiment with twelve tanks, supported by aviation, participated in the counterattack. They managed to get closer to the city on one of the sites. However, the further advance of this grouping was stopped by units of the 47th Guards Artillery Regiment and the 78th Tank Brigade. With their support, the 69th Guards Rifle Regiment restored its lost position. But even after that, the enemy did not give up hope of breaking through to Nevel, continuously attacking for two days, on October 9 and 10.

Moving part of the forces to the defense, the army at the same time tried to develop the offensive. On October 9, the 46th Guards Rifle Division liberated ten settlements and expanded the breakthrough to 20-25 km. The next day, her regiments, having crossed the river. Emenka, occupied the Opukhliki railway station and reached the line of the river. Balazdyn. The 28th and 357th rifle divisions continued to press the enemy, as well as the 185th rifle division and the 153rd army reserve regiment, which delivered an auxiliary strike. However, in all directions, numerical superiority has already passed to the enemy.

On this, the Nevelsk offensive operation ended. In its course, the 3rd shock army inflicted serious damage on the German 263rd infantry and 2nd airfield divisions, which lost more than 7 thousand people killed and wounded. Soviet troops captured more than 400 prisoners, 150 guns and mortars, over 200 machine guns, up to 40 different warehouses, a large amount of small arms, ammunition and other military equipment. At the same time, the losses of the army were relatively small - almost 2 thousand people, of which about 500 were irretrievable. In the 78th tank brigade, out of 54 tanks, only seven were lost.

At the same time, a successful offensive in the Nevel area could not compensate for the failures of the Kalinin Front in the direction of the main attack, in the center and on its left wing, where military operations were carried out with the aim of capturing Vitebsk. The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of October 16 noted on this occasion: “The troops of the Kalinin Front did not fulfill their task - to capture Vitebsk by October 10 - did not fulfill. One of the reasons for this is the lack of organization of the offensive ... It is not carried out by all the forces of the front, more or less simultaneously, but by individual armies in separate sectors, ... which makes it possible for the enemy to maneuver with his own forces and create fists to counter. In the October battles, the front lost 56,474 people killed, wounded and missing. Despite this, he was forced to quickly prepare an offensive in two directions at once - Vitebsk and Gorodok.

After the completion of the Nevelsk offensive operation, the formations of the right wing of the Kalinin Front, until the end of October, repelled the blows of the German troops, which they undertook in order to restore their lost position on the adjacent wings of the North and Center Army Groups. Only in early November, the 1st Baltic Front (created on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the Kalinin Front) resumed the offensive. In the middle of the month, his 4th shock army, in cooperation with the 3rd shock army of the 2nd Baltic Front (created on October 20, 1943 on the basis of the Baltic Front), broke through the enemy’s defenses in a narrow sector west of Nevel and wedged into his location at 45 55 km. However, with the release of the formations of the 4th shock army to the Dretuni area, to the distant approaches to Polotsk, and the 3rd shock army to Pustoshka, their further advance was stopped, as a result of which both armies, numbering up to fifteen divisions, found themselves in a very difficult situation. . They occupied an area stretched for 100 km from north to south and for 55 km from west to east, while the width of the breakthrough area at the base of the wedging was only 9-10 km. In fact, this group fell into a huge "bag" and was under the threat of encirclement. The configuration of the line of contact between the parties and the two-year experience of the war indicated that the enemy was unlikely to miss such an opportunity. This was also evidenced by intelligence data, according to which he was preparing a strike with the aim of destroying Soviet troops in the resulting ledge.

Under such conditions, the commander of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, Colonel-General I.Kh. Bagramyan sought to deprive the German command of the initiative in hostilities and preempt it in going on the offensive. To do this, he decided to conduct an offensive operation (received the name - "Gorodokskaya") with the aim of encircling and defeating the enemy grouping south of Nevel and in the Gorodok area. The headquarters supported the idea of ​​the Military Council of the front and transferred the 11th Guards Army to its structure, the former commander of the 3rd shock army, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky. According to I.Kh. Bagramyan, this army was supposed to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kudena, Bychikha station, Gorodok, and towards it from the "bag" - the 4th shock army of Major General V.I. Shvetsov in the direction of Bychikha station. As a result, it was supposed to encircle six German divisions, which occupied the defenses in the ledge north of Gorodok, and defeat them. Subsequently, the 11th Guards Army was given the task of capturing Gorodok and attacking Vitebsk, bypassing it from the northwest, and the 4th Shock Army was to assist it, moving in the direction of Shumilino from the north. An offensive by the 43rd Army was planned from the east to Vitebsk.

The 11th Guards Army included four rifle corps (eleven rifle divisions), the 1st Tank Corps (97 tanks and self-propelled guns), the 10th Guards Tank Brigade (46 tanks), the 2nd Guards Heavy Tank Regiment (17 tanks) , two breakthrough artillery divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, three M-31 guards mortar brigades, five M-13 guards mortar regiments, four cannon, howitzer and mortar regiments, an engineering brigade, three separate engineer battalions. In addition, it was supported by two assault aviation divisions and was covered by front fighter aircraft.

The army was opposed by an enemy grouping consisting of units of the 211th, 129th, 87th infantry, 2nd and 6th airfield divisions. In the operational depth, the German command concentrated the 20th Panzer and 252nd Infantry Divisions. According to intelligence data, in the direction of the upcoming offensive of the Soviet troops, the enemy prepared two lines in the main line of defense. The first consisted of several echeloned trenches equipped with dugouts, communication passages, wood-and-earth firing points and engineering barriers. On the second defensive line there were separate trenches, machine-gun platforms, artillery firing positions. To the east of the Bychikha station, several intermediate lines were created, consisting of separate strongholds located along the highway and railways. A serious advantage of the defending side was the hard-to-reach terrain, saturated with numerous rivers, streams, swamps, most of which did not freeze through until the end of December.

Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to deliver the main blow in the center of the army strip with the forces of the 36th and 16th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, two auxiliary strikes on the flanks were envisaged: on the right - by the 29th and 5th Guards Rifle Divisions, united under the command of Major General A.S. Ksenofontov; on the left - the 83rd rifle corps. After breaking through the tactical defense zone, it was planned to bring into battle a mobile group - the 1st Tank Corps of Major General V.V. Butkov.

The 4th shock army, which occupied the defense in a wide strip, could only involve two rifle corps (five rifle divisions), the 5th tank corps (91 tanks and self-propelled guns), the 34th guards tank brigade (24 tanks) and 3 th Guards Cavalry Corps, however, significantly weakened in previous battles and numbering about 12 thousand people. She received eight artillery and mortar regiments for reinforcement, including the M-13 regiment, and three separate engineer battalions. An assault aviation division was allocated to support the army.

In accordance with the plan of Major General V.I. Shvetsov, the main blow was delivered from the isthmus between lakes Bernovo and Chernovo in the direction of Bychikha station by the forces of the 2nd Guards Rifle and 5th Tank Corps. Behind them were the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and the 166th Rifle Division, intended to develop success. The 22nd Guards Rifle Corps and the 34th Guards Tank Brigade acted in the direction of another strike.

Due to the ensuing thaw, the start of the operation was postponed several times. Since dirt roads became impassable, the delivery of ammunition to firing positions was carried out by horse-drawn vehicles, and often by hand. Every day in the 11th Guards Army, up to 2 thousand soldiers were allocated from each division to carry shells, mines and other cargo. This made it possible to accumulate about 1.5 rounds of ammunition for guns and mortars. However, in the 4th shock army, the provision of artillery did not exceed 0.6-0.9 ammunition.

The offensive began on the morning of 13 December. From its first minutes, the weather made its own adjustments to the developed plan. That day it got warmer, the sky was covered with clouds, fog fell on the ground, which almost completely ruled out the use of aviation. This greatly complicated the actions of artillery. In the 11th Guards Army, artillery preparation lasted 2 hours. On targets on the front line, the fire was quite effective, but the artillery and mortar batteries located in the depths of the defense, as well as strong points in the villages, hidden from ground observation, were weakly suppressed. Within 7-10 minutes after the infantry units, supported by tanks, went on the attack, German artillery opened concentrated and barrage fire. Having captured a number of strongholds and trenches in the first position, the Soviet troops were forced to stop.

I had to organize artillery preparation again, and then repeat the attack. It took a lot of time. In addition, the German command pulled up reserves, which put up stubborn resistance. By the end of the day, most of the divisions and regiments had advanced an insignificant distance. For example, the penetration of the 16th Guards Rifle Division (Major General E.V. Ryzhikov) into the enemy defenses was only 400-600 m. Only the 84th Guards Rifle Division, Major General G.B. Petersa broke through the first position, breaking 2 km in a strip 1.5 km wide.

This development of events required Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, with the permission of the commander of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front, to change the plan of operation and begin organizing the entry into battle of the 1st Tank Corps and the 83rd Guards Rifle Division, which is being advanced from the reserve, not where it was envisaged, but in the direction of the emerging success. They received the task of completing the breakthrough of the enemy defenses and reaching the Bychikha station area.

The 4th shock army operated more successfully on the first day of the operation. After a 1.5-hour artillery preparation of the formation of the 2nd Guards Rifle Corps, Major General A.P. Beloborodov, with the support of tanks and under the cover of a smoke screen, attacked the enemy and quickly broke through the first position. By the end of the day, the 47th Infantry Division of Colonel G.I. Chernov with the 24th tank brigade of Colonel V.K. Borodavkina moved forward up to 5 km, overcoming the main line of defense. At the same time, the 90th Guards Rifle Division, Colonel V.E. Vlasova, having penetrated to a depth of 3 km, reached the second position. The prerequisites were created for the entry into battle of the 5th tank corps of Major General M.G. Sakhno and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant General P.S. Oslikovsky.

The relatively successful start of the offensive by the strike force of the 1st Baltic Front caused alarm among the German command. At dawn on December 14, it began to conduct counterattacks against units of the 11th Guards Army, involving up to an infantry battalion with the support of 7-15 tanks from the 20th Panzer Division. Having met their strong opposition, the 16th, 11th and 31st Guards Rifle Divisions, which tried to attack in the center and on the left flank, remained at their former lines. At the same time, they attracted enemy reserves to themselves, which made it possible to develop success on the right flank of the army, in the zone of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, Lieutenant General P.F. Malyshev. Here, two tank and one motorized rifle brigades of the 1st Tank Corps were brought into battle, which, together with the 84th Guards Rifle Division, moved forward 4 km by the middle of the day and cut the Nevel-Gorodok highway.

The further task of the corps was to strike along the highway to the south, in the direction of Gorodok. Fulfilling it, tank subunits met several strongholds of the enemy. Trying to get around them, the combat vehicles hit the swampy soil and got stuck in the marshy ground. It took a long time to pull them out, and the pace of the offensive dropped sharply. In the afternoon, the army commander brought the 83rd Guards Rifle Division into battle on the right flank. By 17 o'clock, its units went to the rear of the German 211th Infantry Division.

On that day, they continued to develop the success achieved the day before by the formation of the 4th shock army. Having broken the resistance of the enemy, the 5th Guards Cavalry and 47th Rifle Divisions reached the Nevel - Gorodok railway. Parts of the 90th Guards and 381st (Colonel I.I. Serebryakov) rifle divisions, in cooperation with the 70th tank brigade, were surrounded to an infantry regiment in the large settlement of Vyrovlya. At the same time, the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps, Major General N.B., began an offensive on the left flank of the army. Ibyansky, who overcame 1.5 km in difficult conditions of a wooded and swampy area.

On December 15, both armies, attacking in converging directions, defeated the 211th Infantry Division. The next morning, the 1st Tank Corps and the forward detachment of the 1st Guards Rifle Division (Major General N.A. Kropotin) of the 11th Guards Army and the 5th Tank Corps with advanced units of the 90th Guards Rifle Division of the 4th shock army united in the area of ​​Bychikha. As a result, parts of the German 83rd, 87th, 129th, 252nd Infantry and 2nd Airfield Divisions, as well as six separate special and security battalions, were surrounded. During December 16 and 17, after refusing to lay down their arms and accept the ultimatum of the Soviet command, they were destroyed. Only small scattered groups were able to break through to the west.

In general, during the five-day battles, the strike force of the 1st Baltic Front defeated the enemy in the entire northwestern part of the Gorodok ledge, successfully completing the task of the first stage of the operation. Thus, the neck of the breakthrough south of Nevel was expanded to 30-35 km, which, in turn, led to a significant improvement in the operational position of the 3rd shock army. At the same time, conditions were created for the development of an offensive in the directions of Gorodok and Vitebsk.

In an effort to prevent the strengthening of the Gorodok grouping of the enemy with reserves, Colonel General I.Kh. Bagramyan already on the morning of December 18 set new tasks for the 11th Guards, 4th Shock and 43rd Armies. He still assigned the main role in the second stage of the operation to the 11th Guards Army. She was ordered to take possession of Gorodok, by the end of the next day to reach the line of lakes Losvido and Convenient, and subsequently to liberate Vitebsk.

In accordance with the decision of Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky, the main blow was delivered in the zone of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps, which was attached to the 10th Guards Tank Brigade. He was to conduct an offensive along the railway to Bolshoi Prudok (4-5 km north of Gorodok), bypass the latter from the west with the forces of the 83rd and 26th Guards Rifle Divisions and reach the river. Berezhanka. From the east, the city was supposed to bypass the 16th Guards Rifle Corps. It was planned that the 5th Guards Rifle Division would attack it from the north.

However, to complete the task of capturing Gorodok, the army spent not one, as envisaged by the commander of the front, but as many as five days. The German command attached great importance to the retention of the city area. Here, units of the 20th Panzer, 256th, 129th Infantry and 6th Airfield Divisions occupied the defense sectors. On the approaches to Gorodok and on its outskirts, the enemy prepared four defensive lines. Skillfully using the rugged terrain, replete with dominant heights, lakes and rivers, he put up fierce resistance to the Soviet troops who continued the offensive. Already in the first days, the 1st Tank Corps, which had suffered heavy losses in military equipment, had to be withdrawn from the battle. Only by the end of December 21, the shock group of the army broke through the first two defensive lines. If the advance of the formations operating in the center of its zone was 35 km, on the right flank it did not exceed 15 km. As a result, it was not possible to carry out the plan to encircle and encircle the enemy grouping, which occupied the defense north of Gorodok.

Fights with the aim of breaking through the third defensive line, which took place along the southern shore of the lake. Kosho, the Gorozhanka and Palminka rivers and was equipped with full profile trenches, barbed wire and minefields, began on December 23, were fought all day and were of an extremely fierce nature, turning into hand-to-hand combat. Unable to withstand the offensive impulse of the Soviet troops, the enemy, under the cover of the rearguards, began to retreat.

The commander of the 11th Guards Army planned to resume the offensive at dawn on December 24th. However, the Military Council of the front decided to carry out a night assault on Gorodok. The main argument in favor of this decision was that in the dark the main advantage of the enemy, his firepower, was minimized. At about two in the morning, the 83rd, 26th and 11th Guards Rifle Divisions attacked Gorodok from the west and east. The German units, after some stupor caused by the suddenness of the strike, put up strong resistance in both directions with fire and counterattacks using tanks and assault guns. After the fighting on the western and eastern outskirts of the city reached its highest intensity, the 5th Guards Rifle Division began its assault from the north. During the night and morning, the enemy garrison was divided into groups isolated from each other. Gradually, his resistance began to weaken. By noon, Gorodok was completely cleared of the enemy, who lost up to 2.5 thousand soldiers and officers in the battles for him. In addition, the Soviet units captured 29 guns, 2 tanks, 48 ​​mortars, 41 vehicles, a lot of small arms and ammunition.

After the liberation of Gorodok, the troops of the front continued the offensive without a pause in order to capture Vitebsk on the move by December 30-31. By the evening of December 25, formations of the 11th Guards Army, advancing 4-5 km, reached the first (external) defense line of Vitebsk, which was 25 km from it along the Belodedovo, Sloboda, Borovka line, Zaluchye junction, Shpaki. 6-8 km to the south was the second frontier, stretching from the Zvyazya through Gorodische to the lake. Losvido. The third line was equipped 5-8 km from the city. Especially thoroughly German troops strengthened the roads leading to Vitebsk from Gorodok, Sirotino, Polotsk. In addition, the enemy command significantly strengthened the Vitebsk direction, transferring formations here from other sectors. By December 26, the 3rd and 4th airfield, 256th and 197th infantry divisions, combat groups of the 87th, 211th and 129th infantry divisions, part of the forces 12th Infantry Division, a separate tank battalion, a division of heavy assault guns, an artillery division of the RGK, a number of other separate units and subunits.

The front had a slight advantage in infantry, but was inferior to the enemy in the number of tanks. In addition, the problem of supplying it with ammunition was never solved, since the removal of warehouses from artillery firing positions began to be 180 km. Divisions and regiments, having suffered heavy losses in previous battles, were not replenished with people. The combat potential of the strike force of the front has significantly decreased, while the enemy's ability to repel its offensive, on the contrary, has increased.

The main blow of the 11th Guards Army was delivered along the Gorodok-Vitebsk highway, on which the German command concentrated its main defense efforts. At the same time, in order to mislead the Soviet troops, it deliberately withdrew its units from the northern shore of the lake. Losvido, located west of the highway. After army reconnaissance established the absence of the enemy in this area, Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky decided to bypass his strongest strongholds on the ice of the lake, the length of which from north to south was about 8 km. For this, the 11th and 18th Guards Rifle Divisions, as well as a regiment of the 235th Rifle Division, were allocated.

Encountering no enemy resistance, subunits of three divisions, moving in columns, crossed almost the entire lake. However, when a few hundred meters remained to the southern coast, they were met by concentrated fire of guns, mortars and machine guns. From explosions of shells and mines, the ice on the lake was destroyed, and extensive polynyas and areas with open water formed on its surface. The result of the ensuing tragedy was the death of virtually the entire group. No more than 30 people were able to escape.

After that, the solution of the problem of capturing Vitebsk by the new year, 1944, was unlikely. Indeed, despite the efforts made, the formations of the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies by the end of December 1943 overcame only 5 to 7 km in some directions, after which they went on the defensive. This ended the Gorodok offensive operation. In its course, Soviet troops eliminated the threat of encirclement by the enemy of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, liberated over 1220 settlements, captured 3.3 thousand German soldiers and officers, and captured a lot of military equipment and military property.

In his memoirs, Marshal of the Soviet Union I.Kh. Bagramyan called this operation "one of the most difficult" among those that were carried out under his leadership during the war years. He motivated this by the fact that “firstly, the operation was prepared and carried out in exceptionally difficult conditions against large enemy forces, with purely German scrupulousness, fortified on terrain advantageous for defense, which dominated the initial position of our troops. Due to bad weather and limited visibility, the operation took place with very little participation of aviation and artillery. Secondly, we did not have a significant superiority over the enemy, especially in the second phase of the operation. The possibilities for maneuvering troops, especially mobile formations, during the entire operation were also extremely meager. Thirdly, the front, having a powerful defensive system in front of it, was extremely poorly supplied with ammunition and fuel. Fourthly, our troops were conducting active offensive operations at a time when the neighbors - the 2nd Baltic Front to the north and the Western Front to the south - having not achieved success in the offensive, went over to the defensive.

In general, in the last months of 1943, the 1st Baltic Front was forced to conduct an offensive in extremely difficult conditions, in fact, at the limit of its strength. As I.Kh. Bagramyan later noted: “The setting of tasks that exceeded the capabilities of the troops in terms of their scope was a kind of method, a special method of leadership, aimed at achieving the maximum activity of our offensive operations in Belarus ...”. This led to large losses of the front in people. During October - December they amounted to 168,902 people, including 43,551 people - irrevocably.

Considering the future prospects for armed struggle, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to launch a large-scale offensive in the northwestern and southwestern directions during the winter and spring of 1944. At the same time, the troops operating on the central sector of the Soviet-German front were assigned a supporting role. They were supposed to attract the main forces of Army Group Center and prevent them from maneuvering to reinforce the Wehrmacht grouping in Right-Bank Ukraine. To this end, the 1st Baltic, Western and Belorussian fronts received the task of continuing the offensive operations launched in the fall of 1943 to liberate the eastern regions of Belarus and reach the line of Polotsk, Lepel, Mogilev, r. Bird. The total depth of the planned advance to the west did not exceed 50-150 km. At the same time, front-line and army formations were supposed to operate in the same grouping of forces and means, without receiving additional reinforcement from the Headquarters, all of whose reserves were involved near Leningrad, Novgorod and Ukraine.

The immediate task of the 1st Baltic Front was still to capture Vitebsk, which was considered by the command of Army Group Center as a "gateway to the Baltic." Attaching great importance to holding the city, it concentrated on the approaches to it the 3rd Panzer Army, which included fifteen divisions, including one tank division, seventeen separate RGK field artillery divisions, six mortar battalions, five assault gun brigades, two tank battalions " tiger" and two divisions of heavy anti-tank guns.

By the beginning of January 1944, the front united the 4th shock (Lieutenant General P.F. Malyshev), the 11th Guards (Lieutenant General K.N. Galitsky), the 39th (Lieutenant General N. E. Berzarin), 43rd (Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev) and 3rd Air (Lieutenant General of Aviation N.F. Papivin) armies. In accordance with the plan of the new offensive operation, it was planned to strike the main blow with the forces of the 11th Guards and 4th Shock Armies. They were opposed by up to eight to nine enemy divisions. Taking into account the low staffing of the formations and units of both armies, the Military Council of the Front ordered the creation in all rifle regiments of one assault battalion, reinforced with tanks (eight - ten units), two - three batteries of 45-mm and 76-mm guns, one - two guns caliber 122 mm and a sapper company.

Combat operations in the Vitebsk direction resumed on January 3 with the transition of the 4th shock army to the offensive. During the day, its formations broke through the enemy defenses to a depth of 5 km and reached the line of the Pestunitsa and Zaronok rivers. Here their advance slowed down, and the next day, as a result of stubborn resistance from units of the German 9th Army Corps, it was completely stopped. The 84th and 5th Guards Rifle Corps (Major Generals E.V. Dobrovolsky and I.S. Bezugly) from the 39th Army, which delivered an auxiliary strike, also could not succeed. Their wedging through the Vitebsk-Orsha highway to the west was eliminated by German counterattacks.

Only on January 6, the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army, together with the brigades of the 1st Tank Corps, joined the offensive of the 4th shock and 39th armies. In some areas, they were able to overcome 1-2 km, however, the very next day, as a result of heavy fire from enemy artillery, they suffered heavy losses in people and tanks. So, in the 89th tank brigade, 43 out of 50 combat vehicles were put out of action.

The advance of advancing formations and units was held back by tank ambushes widely used by the enemy command and individual tanks, which often changed firing positions, by heavy mortars and guns advanced for direct fire. In the same place where the Soviet troops achieved success, the enemy immediately launched counterattacks. For example, on January 8, the 29th Infantry Division, Major General Ya.L. Shteiman was liberated by Zapolye, but in the evening German units forced her to leave this settlement.

Until January 18, the divisions of the 4th shock, 11th guards, 39th and additionally brought into battle 43rd armies fought hard battles. They managed to break through the enemy defenses north of Vitebsk, reach the nearest approaches to the city, cut the section of the Polotsk-Vitebsk railway and cover the Vitebsk grouping of the German 3rd Panzer Army from the north-west. But this time the troops of the 1st Baltic Front failed to capture the city. Army General I.Kh. Bagramyan again had to give an order to temporarily stop the offensive "in order to better prepare and resupply the troops ...".

To conduct the next offensive operation, by the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, troops were involved not only from the 1st Baltic, but also from the Western fronts. It was planned that their strike groups, concentrated on adjacent wings, would strike at the directions converging on Zaozerye (southwest of Vitebsk), surround the enemy in the Vitebsk ledge and complete his defeat in a short time. From the composition of the 1st Baltic Front, the 4th Shock and 11th Guards Armies were involved in the operation, which were supposed to operate in the same bands, practically without reinforcement with additional forces and means. Only rifle companies and battalions of the first echelon were slightly replenished with people, and even those at the expense of rear and special units of regiments and divisions.

The fighting began on 3 February. On that day, the formations of the two armies attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense in a strip up to 12 km wide, in some directions wedged into a depth of 5-6 km and captured heavily fortified strongholds - Volkovo, Zapolye, Gurki, Toporino, Kislyaki, Mashkino, Bondarevo. On this occasion, the commander of the German 3rd Panzer Army, Colonel-General G. Reinhardt, in his order, was forced to admit that "today's very difficult day of combat, unfortunately, brought us a significant loss of territory." In an effort to make a difference in the situation, he immediately began to advance infantry units, tank battalions, heavy anti-tank and mortar divisions, batteries of assault guns, and sapper units to the threatened direction. In the following days, the reserves of Army Group Center also began to arrive here.

After that, the advantage in forces and means went over to the side of the enemy. The 4th shock and 11th guards armies simply did not have real opportunities to complete the task. Until mid-February, their rifle formations and units repelled numerous counterattacks by German troops, trying to hold the captured lines. Gradually, positional forms of struggle began to prevail in the actions of the parties, and soon the situation in the zone of the 1st Baltic Front stabilized. It remained almost unchanged until the summer of 1944.

Valery Abaturov,
Leading Research Fellow of the Research
Institute (military history) of the Military Academy
of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Historical Sciences